THOSE THINGS THAT ARE PREDICATED OF GOD RELATIVELY FROM ETERNITY
- Et primo quaeritur utrum relationes dictae de Deo ab aeterno, quae importantur his nominibus pater et filius, sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum.
- Secundo utrum relatio in Deo sit eius substantia.
- Tertio utrum relationes constituant et distinguant personas et hypostases.
- Quarto utrum remota relatione secundum intellectum, remaneat hypostasis in divinis.
Are the Relations Predicated of God From Eternity Real Or Only Logical Relations?
[C.G. IV, xiv: Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. x]
Et primo quaeritur utrum relationes dictae de Deo ab aeterno, quae importantur his nominibus pater et filius, sint relationes reales, vel rationis tantum. Et videtur quod non sint reales. WE have now to inquire into the relations attributed to God from eternity: and the first point of inquiry is whether the relations attributed to God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son be real or only logical relations. It would seem that they are not real. Quia, ut dicit Damascenus, in substantiali Trinitate commune quidem et unum re consideratur, cognitione vero et intellectu est quod diversum vel distinctum est. Sed distinctio personarum fit per relationes. Ergo relationes in divinis sunt rationis tantum. 1. According to Damascene (De Fid. Orth. i, ii) in the subsistent Trinity there is something common and identical, and if there be any distinction or diversity this is in our knowledge and understanding. Now the Persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore in God the relations are merely logical. Praeterea, Boetius dicit: similis est relatio patris ad filium in Trinitate, et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum, ut eius quod est idem ad id quod idem est. Sed relatio identitatis est rationis tantum. Ergo et relatio paternitatis et filiationis. 2. Boethius says (De Trin. iv): Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of the same to the same. Now the relation of identity is purely logical. Therefore such are the relations of paternity and filiation. Praeterea, in Deo ad creaturam non est relatio realis, propter hoc quod Deus sine sui mutatione creaturas producit, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed multo magis sine mutatione producit pater filium, et filius procedit a patre. Ergo non est aliqua realis relatio patris ad filium in divinis, vel e contrario. 3. In God there is no, real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16). Now much more true is it that the Father produced the Son, and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change taking place. Therefore in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son or vice versa. Praeterea, ea quae non sunt perfecta, Deo non attribuuntur, sicut privatio, materia et motus. Sed relatio inter omnia entia habet debilius esse intantum quod eam quidam aestimaverunt de secundis intellectis, ut patet per Commentatorem. Ergo in Deo esse non potest. 4. Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter and movement, are not attributed to God. Now of all things relation has the most unstable being, so much so that some have reckoned it among the predicables; according to the Commentator (Metaph. xi). Therefore there can be no relation in God. Praeterea, omnis relatio in creaturis compositionem facit cum eo cuius est relatio: non enim potest una res alteri inesse sine compositione. Sed in Deo nulla compositio esse potest. Ergo in eo non potest esse realis relatio. 5. In creatures there is always composition of the relation and its subject: for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition. Now there can be no composition in God. Therefore there cannot be real relation in him. Praeterea, simplicissima seipsis differunt. Sed divinae personae sunt simplicissimae. Ergo seipsis differunt, et non per relationes aliquas; ergo non oportet relationes in Deo ponere, cum ad nihil aliud ponantur nisi ad distinguendas personas. 6. Things that are absolutely simple differ from one another by themselves. Now the divine Persons are absolutely simple. Therefore they differ by themselves and not by any relations: and consequently there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the Persons. Praeterea, sicut relationes sunt proprietates personarum divinarum, ita attributa absoluta sunt proprietates essentiae. Sed attributa absoluta sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ergo relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem et non reales. 7. just as the relations are properties of the divine Persons so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now the absolute attributes have only a logical being in God. Therefore the relations in God are merely logical. Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest, ut dicitur III Phys. Sed substantia divina est perfectissima. Ergo nihil quod ad perfectionem pertineat, ei deest. Superfluum est ergo ponere relationes in Deo. 8. A perfect thing lacks nothing (Phys. iii). Now the divine substance is most perfect, and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to its perfection. Therefore there is no need to place relations in God. Praeterea, cum Deus sit summum rerum principium et ultimus finis, ea quae oportet in alia priora reduci, in Deo esse non possunt, sed solum ea ad quae alia reducuntur: sicut esse mobile reducitur ad immobile, et per accidens ad per se; et propter hoc Deus non movetur, nec est in eo aliquod accidens. Sed omne quod dicitur ad aliud, reducitur ad absolutum quod ad se est. Ergo nihil est in Deo ad aliud, sed solum ad se tantum dictum. 9. Seeing that God is the first beginning and last end of things, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot. be in God, but only those things to which others are reduced: thus the movable is reducible to the immovable, and the accidental to the essential; wherefore God is not moved, and nothing in him is accidental. Now everything that denotes ‘to-another’ being is reducible to absolute or ‘ to-itself ‘ being. Therefore in God nothing is relative to another but all is absolute. Praeterea, Deum esse per se necesse est. Sed omne quod est per se necesse esse, est absolutum: relativum enim non potest esse sine correlativo. Quod autem est per se necesse esse, etiam alio remoto esse potest. Ergo in Deo non est aliqua relatio realis. 10. By his very nature God exists of necessity. Now everything that by its very nature exists of necessity is absolute: for the relative cannot exist without its correlative. But that which by its very nature exists of necessity, does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore no real relations are in God. Praeterea, omnis relatio realis, ut in praecedenti quaestione, est habitum, consequitur aliquam quantitatem vel actionem vel passionem. Sed quantitas in Deo non est: dicimus enim Deum sine quantitate magnum, ut Augustinus dicit. Numerus etiam in eo non est, ut dicit Boetius, quem relatio consequi posset, etsi ponatur numerus quem relatio facit. Oportet ergo, si est relatio realis in Deo, quod competat Deo secundum aliquam eius actionem. Non autem potest secundum actionem qua creaturas producit, quia in quaestione praecedenti, est habitum quod in Deo non est realis relatio ad creaturam. Nec iterum secundum actionem personalem quae ponitur in divinis, sicut est generare: nam cum generare in divinis non sit nisi suppositi distincti, distinctionem autem sola relatio facit in divinis, oportet praeintelligere relationem tali actioni; et sic relatio talem actionem consequi non potest. Restat ergo, si aliquam actionem consequatur relatio realiter in Deo existens quod consequatur actionem eius aeternam vel essentialem quae est intelligere et velle. Sed etiam hoc esse non potest: huiusmodi enim actionem consequitur relatio intelligentis ad intellectum, quae in Deo reales non sunt,- alias oporteret quod intelligens et intellectum realiter in divinis distinguerentur,- quod patet esse falsum, quia utrumque de singulis personis praedicatur: non solum enim pater est intelligens, sed et filius et spiritus sanctus; similiter et quilibet eorum est in intellectu. Nulla ergo relatio realis in Deo esse potest, ut videtur. 11. As stated in the preceding question (A. 9) every real relation arises from some kind of quantity or from action or passion. But there is no quantity in God: for in the words of Augustine (De Trin. v, i) “God is great without quantity.” Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says (De Trin.), whence relations could arise, although there is number resulting from relations. Hence if there be real relations in God they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. Not, however, in respect of the action whereby he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question (A. 10) it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. Nor again in respect of the personal action ascribed to God, such as generation: for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action, so that it cannot result from it. Accordingly we must conclude that, if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of intelligence or volition. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real: else in God be who understands and that which he understands would be really distinct, which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each Person: for not only does the Father understand, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and likewise each of them is understood. Wherefore seemingly no real relation is in God. Praeterea, ratio naturalis humana potest pervenire ad cognitionem divini intellectus; probatum est enim demonstrative a philosophis quod Deus est intelligentia. Si ergo actionem intellectus consequantur relationes reales, quae in divinis personas distinguere dicuntur, videtur quod per rationem humanam Trinitas personarum inveniri posset, et sic non esset articulus fidei: nam fides est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. 12. Man’s natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind: for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is intelligence. If then real relations which in God are said to distinguish the Persons arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of Persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb. xi, i). Praeterea, relativa opposita contra alia opposita dividuntur. In Deo autem alia genera oppositionis poni non possunt. Ergo nec relatio. 13. Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition: and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither therefore can relative opposition. Sed contra. Boetius dicit, quod sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem. Haec autem multiplicatio non est secundum rationem tantum, sed secundum rem, ut patet per Augustinum, qui dicit, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres res. Ergo oportet quod relatio sit in divinis non solum rationis, sed etiam rei. On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that “relation alone multiplies the Trinity.” Now this multiplication is not merely logical but is real, for as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three things. Therefore the relations in God are not merely logical but real. Praeterea, nulla res constituitur nisi per rem. Sed relationes in divinis sunt proprietates constituentes personas; persona autem est nomen rei. Ergo oportet et relationes in divinis res esse. Again, that which is real is constituted by something real. Now the relations in God are properties which constitute the Persons; and person signifies something real. Therefore the divine relations also must be real. Praeterea, perfectior est generatio in divinis quam in creaturis. Sed ad generationem in creaturis sequitur relatio realis, scilicet patris et filii. Ergo multo fortius in divinis sunt relationes reales. Again, generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now in creatures generation produces a real relationship, namely that of father and son. Therefore a fortiori relations in God are real. Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sententiam fidei Catholicae sequentes, oportet dicere in divinis relationes reales esse. Ponit enim fides Catholica tres personas in Deo unius essentiae. Numerus autem omnis aliquam distinctionem consequitur: unde oportet quod in Deo sit aliqua distinctio non solum respectu creaturarum, quae a Deo per essentiam differunt, sed etiam respectu alicuius in divina essentia subsistentis. Haec autem distinctio non potest esse secundum aliquod absolutum: quia quidquid absolute in divinis praedicatur, Dei essentiam significat; unde sequeretur quod personae divinae per essentiam distinguerentur, quod est haeresis Arii. Relinquitur ergo quod per sola relativa distinctio in divinis personis attenditur. Haec tamen distinctio non potest esse rationis tantum: quia ea quae sunt sola ratione distincta, nihil prohibet de se invicem praedicari, sicut dicimus principium esse finem, quia punctum unum secundum rem est principium et finis, licet ratione differat; et ita sequeretur quod pater est filius et filius pater, quia, cum nomina imponantur ad significandum rationes nominum, sequeretur quod personae in divinis non distinguerentur nisi secundum nomina: quod est haeresis Sabelliana. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet dicere, relationes in Deo quasdam res esse: quod qualiter sit, sequendo sanctorum dicta, investigari oportet, licet ad plenum ad hoc ratio pervenire non possit. I answer that those who follow the teaching of the catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. The catholic faith teaches that there are in God three Persons of one Essence. Now number results from some kind of distinction — wherefore in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature. But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence, so that it would follow that the divine Persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows then that the divine Persons are distinct only by their relations. Now this distinction cannot be merely logical, because things that are only logically distinct can be predicated of one another: thus we say that the beginning is the end, because one point in reality is both beginning and end (of a line) although there is a logical distinction. Hence it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father: because seeing that names are given in order to distinguish things, it would follow that the divine Persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be we must endeavour to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to do so fully. Sciendum est ergo, quod cum realis relatio intelligi non possit, nisi consequens quantitatem vel actionem seu passionem, oportet quod aliquo istorum modorum ponamus in Deo relationem esse. In Deo autem quantitas esse non potest, neque continua neque discreta, nec aliquid cum quantitate similitudinem habens, nisi multitudo quam relatio facit, cui oportet relationem praeintelligere, et unitas quae essentiae competit, ad quam relatio consequens non est realis, sed rationis tantum; sicut relatio quam importat hoc nomen idem, ut supra dictum est. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet in eo ponere relationem actionem consequentem. Actionem dico non quae in aliquod patiens transeat: quia in Deo nihil potest esse patiens, cum non sit ibi materia; ad id autem quod est extra Deum, non est in Deo realis relatio, ut ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod consequatur relatio realis in Deo actionem manentem in agente: cuiusmodi actiones sunt intelligere et velle in Deo. Sentire enim, cum organo corporeo compleatur, Deo non potest competere, qui est omnino incorporeus. Et propter hoc dicit Dionysius, quod in Deo est paternitas perfecta, idest non corporaliter nec materialiter, sed intelligibiliter. Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem, qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. We must observe then that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes. Now in God there cannot be quantity either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity, except number arising from and presupposing relation; and unity, which regards the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely logical, as, for instance, the relation implied in the word same, as we have stated in the preceding question (A. ii). It follows then that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action: not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved (Q. vii, A. 10). Consequently real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are intelligence and volition, since sensation through being effected by means of a corporeal organ cannot be attributed to God who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi) says that in God Fatherhood is perfect, i.e. not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. Now the one who understands may have a relation to four things in understanding: namely to the thing understood, to the intelligible species whereby his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual concept. This concept differs from the three others. A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. It differs from the thing understood, for the latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas the intellectual concept is only in the intellect. Moreover the intellectual concept is ordered to the thing understood as its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its concept thereof that it may know the thing understood. Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. It differs from the intelligible species, because the latter which makes the intellect actual is considered as the principle of the intellect’s act, since every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual: and it is made actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action. Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. And it differs from the act of the intellect, because it is considered as the term of the action, and as something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or negative proposition. Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem. Huiusmodi ergo conceptio, sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat. Oritur quidem ab intellectu per suum actum; est vero similitudo rei intellectae. Cum vero intellectus seipsum intelligit, verbum praedictum, sive conceptio, eiusdem est propago et similitudo, scilicet intellectus seipsum intelligentis. Et hoc ideo contingit, quia effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam: forma autem intellectus est res intellecta. Et ideo verbum quod oritur ab intellectu, est similitudo rei intellectae, sive sit idem quod intellectus, sive aliud. Huiusmodi autem verbum nostri intellectus, est quidem extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus (non enim est de essentia, sed est quasi passio ipsius), non tamen est extrinsecum ab ipso intelligere intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto. Si ergo aliquis intellectus sit cuius intelligere sit suum esse, oportebit quod illud verbum non sit extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus, sicut nec ab intelligere. Huiusmodi autem est intellectus divinus: in Deo enim idem est esse et intelligere. Oportet ergo quod eius verbum non sit extra essentiam eius, sed ei coessentiale. Sic ergo in Deo potest inveniri origo alicuius ex aliquo, scilicet verbi et proferentis verbum, unitate essentiae servata. Ubicumque enim est origo alicuius ab aliquo, ibi oportet ponere realem relationem vel tantum ex parte eius quod oritur, quando non accipit eamdem naturam quam habet suum principium, sicut patet in exortu creaturae a Deo; vel ex parte utriusque, quando scilicet oriens attingit ad naturam sui principii, sicut patet in hominum generatione, ubi relatio realis est et in patre et in filio. Verbum autem in divinis est coessentiale suo principio, ut ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod in divinis sit realis relatio et ex parte verbi et ex parte proferentis verbum. This intellectual concept in us is called properly a word, because it is this that is signified by the word of mouth. For the external utterance does not signify the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the concept of the intellect by means of which it relates to the thing. Accordingly this concept or word by which our intellect understands a thing distinct from itself originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through an act of the intellect: and it is the likeness of the thing understood. Now when the intellect understands itself this same word or concept is its progeny and likeness, that is of the intellect understanding itself. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the thing understood. Wherefore the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else. And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the essence of the intellect (for it is not the essence but a kind of passion thereof), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect’s act of intelligence, since this act cannot be complete without it. If then there be an intellect whose act of intelligence is its very essence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the essence of that intellect even as it is not extrinsic to its act of intelligence. Such is the divine intellect: since in God to be and to understand are the same. Wherefore his word is not outside his essence, but co-essential with it. Accordingly in God we find the origin of one from another, namely a word proceeding, and one from whom the word proceeds without prejudice to the unity of the essence. For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real relation—either only on the part of that which originates, when it receives not the same nature as its principle, as in the creature’s origination from God—or on the part of both, when to wit that which originates attains to the nature of its principle, as when a man is begotten, and a real relation results between father and son. Now in God the Word is co-essential with its principle, as we have proved. It follows then that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the Speaker. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in divinis personis re quidem essentiali est unitas; distinctio vero ratione, id est relatione, quae non differt ab essentia re, sed sola ratione, ut infra patebit. Reply to the First Objection. In the divine Persons there is essential unity, but there is a logical distinction by reason of the relation which does not differ from the Essence really but only logically, as we shall state further on. Ad secundum dicendum, quod relatio quae est in divinis personis habet quidem similitudinem cum relatione identitatis, si unitas essentiae consideretur; sed si consideretur origo unius ab alio in eadem natura, ex hoc relationes praedictas oportet esse reales. Reply to the Second Objection. Relation in the divine Persons bears a certain likeness to the relation of identity if we consider the unity of Essence: whereas if we consider the origin of one (Person) from another in the same nature we must conclude that these relations are real. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut Deus non mutatur in productione suae creaturae, ita non mutatur in productione sui verbi: sed tamen creatura non attingit ad essentiam et naturam divinam; unde essentia divina non communicatur creaturae. Et propter hoc relatio Dei ad creaturam non fit propter aliquid quod sit in Deo, sed solum secundum id quod fit ex parte creaturae. Sed verbum producitur ut coessentiale ipsi Deo; et ideo secundum id quod in Deo est, refertur Deus ad suum verbum, non solum secundum id quod ex parte verbi est. Tunc enim est relatio realis ex parte unius et non ex parte alterius, quando relatio consequitur per id quod est ex uno, et non per id quod ex alio, sicut patet in scibili et scientia: huiusmodi enim relationes causantur per actum scientis, non per aliquid scibile. Reply to the Third Objection. just as God undergoes no change in producing his creature, so is he not changed in the production of his Word. Yet the creature does not attain to the divine essence and nature, wherefore the divine essence is not communicated to the creature. For this reason the relation of God to the creature does not result from anything in God but only with respect to something done on the part of the creature. On the other hand the Word is produced as co-essential with God himself; wherefore God is related to his Word in respect of something in God and not only with respect to something on the part of the Word. For then is there a real relation on one side and not on the other, when the cause of the relation is on one side and not on the other: for instance, the relation between the knowable object and knowledge results from the act of the knower and not from anything that he may know. Ad quartum dicendum, quod relatio habet esse debilissimum quod est eius tantum; sic tamen non est in Deo: non enim habet aliud esse quam esse substantiae, ut infra patebit; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relation has a most unstable existence, if this belongs to it alone: but it is not so in God, for in him relation has no other existence than that of the substance, as we shall show further on in the next Article. Hence the argument fails. Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de relatione reali, quae habet aliud esse ab esse substantiae cui inest; sic autem non est in proposito, ut infra patebit. Reply to the Fifth Objection. This argument considers the real relation whose being is distinct from the substance in which it is. But this is not so in the case in point, as we shall show further on. Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum personae divinae relationibus distinguantur, non alio differunt quam seipsis, quia relationes sunt ipsae personae subsistentes, ut infra, patebit. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since the divine Persons differ by their relations only, they do not differ otherwise than by themselves, for the relations are the very Persons who subsist, as we shall prove (A. 4). Ad septimum dicendum, quod attributa essentialia quae sunt proprietates essentiae, sunt in Deo realiter, et non secundum rationem. Bonitas enim Dei est res quaedam, et similiter eius sapientia, et ita de aliis, licet ab essentia non differant nisi ratione; sic etiam est de relationibus, ut infra patebit. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The essential attributes which are properties of the essence are in God really and not logically. For God’s goodness is something. real, and so is his wisdom and so forth, although they are not distinct from his essence otherwise than logically: and the same applies to the relations, as we shall prove further on. Ad octavum dicendum, quod substantia Dei esset imperfecta si aliquid ei inesset quod non esset ipsa. Relatio autem in Deo est substantia eius, ut infra patebit; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Eighth Objection. God’s substance would be imperfect were there anything in it distinct therefrom. But in God relation is his substance, as we shall prove further on: wherefore the objection fails. Ad nonum dicendum, quod mobile et accidens reducuntur ad aliquid prius sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Nam accidens imperfectum est, et similiter motus est imperfecti actus. Sed hoc quod dicitur ad aliud, quandoque sequitur perfectionem rei, sicut patet in intellectu: nam consequitur eius operationem quae est eius perfectio; et ideo perfectio divina non prohibet relationem in Deo ponere sicut prohibet ibi ponere motum et accidens. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The movable and the accidental are reducible to something previous as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is imperfect: and movement is the act of what is imperfect. But relation sometimes follows from the perfection of a thing, as in the case of the intellect, since it follows the operation which is its perfection. Hence the divine perfection does not hinder us from ascribing relations to God, as it forbids us to ascribe movement and accident to him. Ad decimum dicendum, quod id quod necesse est per se esse, non refertur ad aliquid quod sit extraneum ab ipso: nihil tamen prohibet quin referatur ad aliquid intra ipsum. Unde cum non dicatur esse necesse per aliud, dicitur esse necesse per se ipsum. Reply to the Tenth Objection. That which necessarily exists of itself is not related to anything extraneous, but nothing prevents it from being related to something within it. Wherefore as it is not said to be necessary through another, it is said to be necessary of itself. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod relatio realis in Deo consequitur actionem intellectus, non quidem ita quod relatio realis intelligatur intelligentis ad intellectum, sed ad verbum: quia intellectum non oritur ab intelligente, sed verbum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Real relation in God follows the action of his intellect, not as though this real relation were that of the one who understands to what he understands, but to his word: for the word and not the thing understood proceeds from him who understands. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod licet ratio naturalis possit pervenire ad ostendendum quod Deus sit intellectus, modum tamen intelligendi non potest invenire sufficienter. Sicut enim de Deo scire possumus quod est, sed non quid est; ita de Deo scire possumus quod intelligit, sed non quo modo intelligit. Habere autem conceptionem verbi in intelligendo, pertinet ad modum intelligendi: unde ratio haec sufficienter probare non potest; sed ex eo quod est in nobis aliqualiter per simile coniecturare. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although natural reason is able to succeed in proving that God is intelligence, it is not able to discover adequately his mode of understanding. just as we are able to know that God. is but not what he is: even so we are able to know that God understands, but not how he understands. Now to understand by conceiving a word belongs to the mode of understanding: wherefore reason cannot prove this adequately, but it can form a kind of conjecture by comparison with what takes place in us. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in aliis oppositionibus semper alterum est ut imperfectum, vel non ens vel ut habens aliquid de non ente: negatio enim est non ens, et privatio est quaedam negatio, et duorum contrariorum alterum semper habet aliquid privationis; unde aliae oppositiones in Deo esse non possunt sicut oppositio relationis, quae ex neutra parte importat imperfectionem. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. In other kinds of opposition one of the extremes is always by way of being imperfect or non-existent, or with an admixture of non-entity: since negation excludes being and privation is a negation, and of two contraries one always includes a privation. Hence other kinds of opposition cannot be in God, whereas relative opposition can because on neither side does it imply imperfection.
Is Relation in God the Same As His Substance?
[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxviii, A. 2: C.G. IV, xiv]
Secundo quaeritur utrum relatio in Deo sit eius substantia. Et videtur quod non. THE second point of inquiry is whether in God relation is his substance: and seemingly it is not. Nulla enim substantia est relatio: haec est quaedam propositio immediata, sicut et haec: nulla substantia est quantitas. Ergo nec divina substantia est relatio. 1. That no substance is a relation is a self-evident proposition like no substance is a quantity. Neither then is God’s substance a relation. 2. It will be replied that God’s substance is a real and not merely a logical relation. Sed dicendum, quod divina substantia est relatio secundum rem, non tamen secundum rationem.- Sed contra, ratio cui nihil respondet in re, est cassa et vana. Sed nihil vane in Deo debet poni. Ergo non potest esse quod relatio differat ab essentia ratione existente. On the contrary an idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain. But nothing is vain in God. Therefore it is not possible that relation in God differ logically from his substance. Praeterea, personae divinae distinguuntur relationibus, sola enim relatio multiplicat Trinitatem, ut dicit Boetius. Si ergo personae divinae secundum substantiam non distinguuntur, —relatio autem nihil addit supra substantiam secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem— sequetur quod personae divinae distinguantur solum secundum rationem, quod est haeresis Sabellianae. 3. The divine Persons are distinct by their relations: for “relation alone multiplies the Trinity,” according to Boethius (De Trin.). If then the divine Persons are not distinct in substance, seeing that the relations add nothing real to the substance but only a logical consideration, it will follow that the distinction between the divine Persons is only logical; which is the heresy of Sabellius. Praeterea, personae divinae non distinguuntur secundum aliquid absolutum, quia sequeretur quod distinguerentur secundum essentiam, ex hoc quod ea quae de Deo dicuntur absolute significant eius essentiam, ut bonitas, sapientia, et huiusmodi. Si ergo relationes sunt idem quod divina substantia, oportebit quod vel personae non distinguantur secundum relationes, vel quod distinctio personarum sit secundum essentiam. 4. The divine Persons are not distinct by anything absolute . because it would follow that they are distinct in essence, since what is said of God absolutely signifies his essence; for instance, goodness, wisdom and so forth. If then the relations are the same thing as the divine essence it will follow either that the divine Persons are not distinct by the relations, or that they are distinct in essence. Praeterea, si relatio est ipsa substantia Dei, sequeretur quod sicut Deus et sua magnitudo pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae in divinis —ex hoc quod Deus est sua magnitudo— ita pari ratione paternitas pertinebit ad praedicamentum substantiae; et sic omne quod de Deo dicitur, dicetur secundum substantiam; quod est contra Augustinum qui dicit, quod non omne quod de Deo dicitur, dicitur secundum suam substantiam: dicitur enim Deus ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium. 5. If relation is the same thing as God’s very substance, it will follow that just as God and his greatness belong to the predicament of substance, since God is his own greatness, so likewise Paternity will belong to the predicament of substance: so that whatsoever is said of God will be said in reference to his substance, which is contrary to the statement of Augustine (De Trin. v, 4, 5) that not all the things said of God refer to his substance: for relations are ascribed to God such as that of Father and Son. Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de praedicato, praedicatur de subiecto. Sed si relatio est ipsa essentia divina, haec praedicatio erit vera: essentia divina est paternitas; et pari ratione ista: filiatio est divina essentia. Ergo sequetur quod filiatio est paternitas. 6. Whatsoever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject. But if relation is God’s very essence, it will be true to say: The divine essence is Paternity, and with equal reason: Filiation is the divine essence: and thus it would follow that Filiation is Paternity. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt idem, ita se habent, quod quidquid praedicatur de uno, praedicetur de alio, quia, secundum philosophum, quantamcumque differentiam assignaverimus, ostendentes erimus quod non idem. Sed de essentia divina praedicatur quod sit sapiens, quod creet mundum, et huiusmodi; quae non videntur praedicari posse de paternitate vel filiatione. Ergo relatio in divinis non est essentia divina. 7. Things that are the same admit of the same predicates thus the Philosopher says (Top. i): “The slightest difference that we may assign will show that the things are not the same.” Now we predicate of the divine essence that it is wise, that it created the world and so on: while such things, apparently, are not predicated of Paternity and Filiation. Therefore in God relation is not the divine essence. Praeterea, id quod facit distinctionem in divinis personis, non est idem cum eo quod non distinguit nec distinguitur. Sed relatio in divinis distinguit; essentia autem non distinguit neque distinguitur. Ergo non sunt idem. 8. That which distinguishes the divine Persons is not the same thing as that which neither distinguishes them nor is itself distinguished. Now in God relation distinguishes while essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished. Therefore they are not the same thing. Praeterea, idem per suam essentiam non potest esse principium contrariorum, nisi per accidens. Sed distinctio, cuius est principium relatio in divinis, opponitur unitati, cuius est principium essentia. Ergo relatio et essentia non sunt idem. 9. One and the same thing cannot by its essence be the cause of contraries except accidentally. Now distinction which in God results from relation is contrary to unity, the principle of which is the essence. Therefore relation and essence are not the same thing. Praeterea, eorum quae sunt idem, in quocumque est unum et aliud. Si ergo essentia divina et paternitas est idem, in quocumque est essentia divina, erit et paternitas. Sed essentia divina est in filio. Ergo et paternitas; quod patet esse falsum. 10. If two things are the same with each other, where one is there is the other. If then the divine essence is the same thing with Paternity, wheresoever is the divine essence there will be Paternity. But it is in the Son. Therefore Paternity is also: which is clearly false. Praeterea, relatio et essentia differunt saltem ratione in divinis. Sed ubi est diversa ratio, sive definitio, est diversorum esse: quia definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Ergo aliud erit esse relationis in divinis, et aliud substantiae. Ergo relatio et substantia differunt secundum esse, et ita realiter. 11. In God relation and essence differ at least in our conception of them. Now where the concept or definition differs, there is a different being; since a definition states the quiddity of a thing’s being. Hence in God the being of the relation will differ from the being of the substance. Consequently relation and substance differ in being, and therefore really. Praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est ad aliud se habere, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Esse ergo relationis est in respectu ad aliud, non autem esse substantiae. Ergo relatio et substantia non sunt idem secundum esse; et sic idem quod prius. 12. According to the Philosopher (Praedic.) the being of relation is to be ‘to-another.’ Therefore the being of relation and not the being of substance consists in respect to another. Therefore relation and substance are not the same in being; and we come to the same conclusion as before. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod aliquid dicitur in Deo non substantive sed relative. Quod autem substantiam divinam significat, dicitur substantialiter. Ergo relatio in divinis non significat substantiam divinam; et sic idem quod prius. 13. Augustine says (De Trin. V, 4, 5) that something is said of God not substantively but relatively. Now that which signifies the divine substance is predicated substantively. Therefore in God relation does not signify the essence: and the same conclusion follows. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus non eo Deus est quo pater est. Sed essentia divina est Deus; paternitate autem est pater. Ergo essentia non est paternitas; et sic relationes in Deo non sunt divina substantia. 14. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that God is not God in the same way as he is Father. Now he is God by the divine essence, but Father by Paternity. Therefore the essence is not Paternity: wherefore in God the relations are not the divine substance. Sed contra. Quidquid est in Deo, Deus est, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed relatio est in Deo, sicut paternitas in patre. Ergo relatio est ipse Deus, et divina substantia. On the contrary, whatsoever is in God is God, as Augustine says (De Trin. V, 5). Now relation is in God, as Paternity in the Father. Therefore relation is God himself and the divine substance. Praeterea, omne suppositum in quo sunt diversae res, est compositum. Sed in persona patris est paternitas et essentia. Si igitur paternitas et essentia divina sunt duae res, sequeretur quod persona patris sit composita; quod patet esse falsum. Oportet ergo quod relatio in divinis sit ipsa substantia. Again every supposit containing things that are different is composite. Now in the person of the Father there is Paternity and the essence: wherefore if Paternity and the divine essence are two things it will follow that the person of the Father is composite; and this is clearly false. It follows therefore that in God relation is the very substance. Respondeo. Dicendum quod, supposito quod relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet dicere quod sint essentia divina: alias oporteret ponere compositionem in Deo, et quod relationes in divinis essent accidentia, quia omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substantiam est accidens. Oporteret etiam quod aliqua res esset aeterna, quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt haeretica. I answer that given that there are relations in God we are bound to say that they are the divine essence: else we would have to say that there is composition in God and that the divine relations are accidents, since whatsoever adheres to a thing besides its substance is an accident. It would also follow that something that is not the divine substance is eternal; and all these things are heretical. Ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod inter novem genera quae continentur sub accidente, quaedam significantur secundum rationem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est inesse; et ideo illa dico significari per modum accidentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri, sicut quantitas et qualitas; quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est, et similiter qualitas. Ad aliquid vero non significatur secundum rationem accidentis: non enim significatur ut aliquid eius in quo est, sed ut ad id quod extra est. Et propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis, sed scibilis. Unde quidam attendentes modum significandi in relativis, dixerunt, ea non esse inhaerentia substantiis, scilicet quasi eis assistentia: quia significantur ad quoddam medium inter substantiam quae refertur, et id ad quod refertur. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod in rebus creatis relationes non sunt accidentia, quia accidentis esse est inesse. Unde etiam quidam theologi, scilicet Porretani, huiusmodi opinionem usque ad divinam relationem extenderunt, dicentes, relationes non esse in personis, sed eis quasi assistere. Et quia essentia divina est in personis, sequebatur quod relationes non sunt essentia divina; et quia omne accidens inhaeret, sequebatur quod non essent accidentia. Et secundum hoc solvebant verbum Augustini inductum, quod scilicet relationes non praedicantur de Deo secundum substantiam, nec secundum accidens. Sed ad hanc opinionem sequitur quod relatio non sit res aliqua, sed solum secundum rationem: omnis enim res vel est substantia vel accidens. Unde etiam quidam antiqui posuerunt relationes esse de secundis intellectis, ut Commentator dicit XI Metaph. Et ideo oportet hoc etiam Porretanos dicere, quod relationes divinae non sunt nisi secundum rationem. Et sic sequetur quod distinctio personarum non erit realis; quod est haereticum. Accordingly to make the matter clear we must observe that some of the nine kinds of accident are defined with regard to the nature of an accident, for the nature of an accident is to inhere; wherefore I describe those as defined. with regard to the nature of an accident which are defined as inhering to a subject, such as quantity and quality. On the other hand relation is not defined with regard to its nature as an accident, for it is described not as being in a subject but as having a respect to something extraneous. For this reason the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that knowledge as a relation is not in the knower but in the thing known. Hence through taking note of the manner of signification in relative terms some said that they are not adherents but as it were assistants to substance, because they denote a kind of medium between the related substance and that to which it is related. From this it was necessary to infer that in creatures relations are not accidents, since the being of an accident is to be in (a subject). Hence certain theologians of the school of Gilbert de la Porrée extended this opinion to the divine relations, and contended that the relations are not in the divine Persons but are assistants to them as it were. And seeing that the divine essence is in the Persons it followed that the relations are not the divine essence: and since every accident adheres (to a subject) it followed that they are not accidents: and in this sense they took the saying of Augustine quoted above, namely that relations are not predicated of God either substantively or accidentally. But from this opinion it follows that relation is not an objective reality but only a subjective idea: since every real thing is either a substance or an accident. For this reason some of the ancient reckoned relation among the predicables, as the Commentator remarks (Metaph. xi, com. 19): wherefore the followers of de la Porrée are compelled to hold that the divine relations are merely logical. Thus it would follow that the distinction between the Persons is not real: which is heretical. Unde dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse inhaerens, quod tamen non significatur ut inhaerens, sicut etiam actio non significatur ut in agente, sed ut ab agente, et tamen constat actionem esse in agente. Et similiter, licet ad aliquid non significetur ut inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. Et hoc quando relatio est res aliqua; quando vero est secundum rationem tantum, tunc non est inhaerens. Et sicut in rebus creatis oportet quod sit accidens, ita oportet quod sit in Deo substantia, quia quidquid est in Deo, est eius substantia. Oportet ergo relationes secundum rem, esse divinam substantiam; quae tamen non habent modum substantiae, sed habent alium modum praedicandi ab his quae substantialiter praedicantur in Deo. Accordingly we must reply that a thing may be adherent and yet not be defined as adherent: even as action is not defined as being in but from the agent, and yet it is clear that it is in the agent. In like manner although relation is not defined as adhering yet it needs must be adherent that is to say when it is a real relation, for if it be a logical relation it is not adherent. And just as in creatures it must be an accident, so in God it must be the substance, since whatsoever is in God is his substance. Therefore real relations, must be the divine substance, yet they have not the mode of substance, but receive another mode of predication differing from those things that are predicated of God substantively. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nulla substantia quae est in genere, potest esse relatio, quia est definita ad unum genus; et per consequens excluditur ab alio genere. Sed essentia divina non est in genere substantiae, sed est supra omne genus, comprehendens in se omnium generum perfectiones. Unde nihil prohibet id quod est relationis, in ea inveniri. Reply to the First Objection. No substance that is in a genus can be a relation, because it is confined to one genus and is therefore excluded from another. The divine essence however! is not in the genus of substance, but is above every genus, and comprises the perfection of all genera Wherefore nothing prevents its including that which pertains to relation. Ad secundum dicendum, quod alia est ratio substantiae et relationis, et utrique respondet aliquid in re, quae Deus est; non tamen aliqua res diversa, sed una et eadem. Et hoc praecipue convenit quod duabus rationibus respondet una res, quando natura perfecte comprehendit ipsam rem; et sic est in proposito. Reply to the Second Objection. Substance and relation differ logically and in that thing which is God something corresponds to both: yet not a different thing to each but one and the same. Moreover it is most appropriate that one thing should correspond to two points of view, when its nature comprises that thing perfectly: and thus it is in the case in point. Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet relatio non addat supra essentiam aliquam rem, sed solum rationem, tamen relatio est aliqua res, sicut etiam bonitas est aliqua res in Deo, licet non differat ab essentia nisi ratione; et similiter est de sapientia. Et ideo sicut ea quae pertinent ad bonitatem vel sapientiam, realiter Deo conveniunt, ut intelligere et alia huiusmodi, ita etiam id quod est proprium realis relationis, scilicet opponi et distingui, realiter in divinis invenitur. Reply to the Third Objection. Although relation does not add a thing to the essence, but only a point of view, yet it is itself a thing, even as goodness is a thing in God, and yet it does not differ from the essence otherwise than logically; and the same applies to wisdom. Wherefore just as things which pertain to goodness or wisdom, such as intelligence and so on, are really in God, even so that which is proper to a real relation, namely opposition and distinction, is really in God. Ad quartum dicendum, quod attributa essentialia non solum significant id quod est essentia divina, sed etiam significant per talem modum, quia significant aliquid ut in Deo existens; et propter hoc differentia, quae esset secundum absoluta, redundaret in diversitatem essentiae. Relationes autem divinae, licet significent id quod est divina essentia, non tamen per modum essentiae, quia non per modum inexistentis, sed per modum se habentis ad aliud. Unde distinctio quae attenditur secundum relationes in divina, non designat distinctionem in essentia, sed solum in hoc quod est ad aliud se habere per modum originis, ut supra expositum est. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The essential attributes not only signify that which is the divine essence, but they also signify it in a certain way, since they signify something as existing in God: and for this reason a difference in respect of anything absolute would reflect on the divine essence. On the other hand the divine relations, though they signify that which is the divine essence, they do not signify it by way of essence, since they do not convey the idea of existence in something, but of reference towards something else. Hence the distinction arising from the divine relations does not point to a distinction in the essence but only to respect to another by way of origin, as explained above. Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet relatio sit substantia divina, non tamen significat per modum substantiae, ut supra expositum est; et ideo non dicitur secundum substantiam, quia dici secundum substantiam pertinet ad modum significandi. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the relation is the divine substance, it does not convey the idea of substance, as already explained: wherefore it is not predicated substantively, because to be predicated thus belongs to the mode of signification. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ratio illa tenet in praedicabilibus per se. Per se autem praedicatur aliquid de aliquo, quod praedicatur de eo secundum propriam rationem; quod vero non secundum propriam rationem praedicatur, sed propter rei identitatem, non etiam praedicatur per se. Cum ergo dicitur: essentia divina est paternitas, non praedicatur paternitas de essentia divina propter identitatem rationis, sed propter identitatem rei; et similiter nec essentia de paternitate, ut iam dictum est, quia alia est ratio essentiae et relationis. Et ideo in praedicto processu incidit fallacia accidentis: licet enim in Deo nullum sit accidens, est tamen quaedam similitudo accidentis, in quantum ea quae de se invicem praedicantur secundum accidens et differunt ratione, sunt unum subiecto. Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to the per se predicables. Now a thing is predicated per se of something when the predication regards the proper nature of that thing; whereas if the predication arises not from the proper nature but from identity, it is not even per se predication. Hence when it is said, The divine essence is Paternity, Paternity is predicated of the divine essence on account not of a logical but of a real identity: and the same applies if essence be predicated of Paternity, as already stated; because essence and relation differ logically. Wherefore this argument falls into the fallacy of accident: because although there is no accident in God, there is a certain likeness to an accident, inasmuch as things which are predicated of one another in respect of an accident while differing logically have but one subject. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut philosophus dicit in III Phys., non oportet quod omnia eadem praedicentur quolibet modo de eisdem, sed solum de eisdem secundum rationem. Essentia autem divina et paternitas, etsi sint idem re, non sunt idem ratione; et ideo non oportet quod quidquid praedicatur de aliquo uno, praedicetur de alio. Sciendum tamen, quod quaedam sunt quae consequuntur proprias rationes essentiae et relationis: sicut quod esse commune sequitur ad essentiam, distinguere sequitur ad relationem. Unde unum horum ab alio removetur, neque enim essentia distinguit, neque relatio est communis. Quaedam vero non quantum ad principale significatum, sed quantum ad modum significandi, habent aliquam differentiam a ratione essentiae vel relationis; et ista praedicantur quidem de essentia vel relatione, licet non proprie; et huiusmodi sunt adiectiva, et verba substantialia, ut bonus, sapiens, intelligere, et velle: huiusmodi enim quantum ad rem significatam, significant ipsam essentiam; sed tamen significant eam per modum suppositi, et non in abstracto. Et ideo propriissime dicuntur de personis, et de nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut Deus, vel pater bonus, sapiens, creans, et alia huiusmodi; de essentia autem in abstracto significata, et non per modum suppositi, sed improprie. Adhuc autem minus proprie de relationibus, quia huiusmodi conveniunt supposito secundum essentiam, non autem secundum relationem: Deus enim est bonus, vel creans, ex eo quod habet essentiam, non ex eo quod habet relationem. Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3) it is not things which are iii any way the same that receive the same predicates but only those that have the same definition. Now the divine essence and Paternity, although the same in reality, have not the same definition: wherefore it does not follow that whatsoever is predicated of the one is predicated of the other. It must be observed, however, that certain things follow the definitions of essence and relation: wherefore one of these removes the other; thus neither does essence distinguish nor is relation common. On the other hand certain things imply a certain difference from the definition of essence or relation, not in their principle signification but in their mode of signifying: and these are predicated of essence or relation, although not properly: such are adjectives and verbal substantives, e.g. good, wise, to understand, to will: because suchlike terms as to the thing signified,. signify the essence; ,yet they signify it as though it were a supposit and not in the abstract. For this reason good, wise, creating and the like are most appropriately predicated of the Persons and of the concrete essential names such as God, Father; yet they may be predicated, albeit improperly, of the essence in the abstract and not taken as a supposit. Still less properly are they predicated of the relations: because they are applicable to the supposit in respect of the essence and not of the relation: thus God is good or creative through having his essence—not through having a relation. Ad octavum dicendum, quod illud quod facit distinctionem, potest esse cum eo quod nec distinguit nec distinguitur, idem re, sed non ratione. Reply to the Eighth Objection. That which causes a distinction and that which neither distinguishes nor is distinguished can be the same in reality but not logically. Ad nonum dicendum, quod unitas essentiae non opponitur distinctioni relationum: unde non sequitur quod relatio et essentia sint causae oppositorum. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The unity of the essence is not opposed to the distinction of the relations: wherefore it does not follow that relation and essence are causes of contraries. Ad decimum dicendum, quod quaecumque sunt eadem re et ratione oportet quod in quocumque est unum, sit aliud. Non autem hoc oportet de his quae sunt eadem re, sed non ratione; sicut instans est idem quod est principium futuri et finis praeteriti, non tamen principium futuri dicitur esse in praeterito, sed id quod est futuri principium; et similiter non dicitur quod paternitas est in filio, sed id quod est, scilicet essentia. Reply to the Tenth Objection. If two things be the same both really and logically, wherever the one is there must the other be. But this does not necessarily apply when they are the same really but not logically: thus the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: yet not the beginning of the future but that which is the beginning of the future is said to be in the past. In like manner we do not say that Paternity is in the Son, but that which is Paternity, the essence. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in divinis nullo modo est esse nisi essentiae, sicut nec intelligere nisi intellectus; et propter hoc, sicut in Deo est tantum unum intelligere, ita etiam unum esse. Et ideo nullo modo concedendum est, quod aliud sit esse relationis in divinis, et aliud essentiae. Ratio autem non significat esse, sed esse quid, id est quid aliquid est. Unde duae rationes unius rei non demonstrant duplex esse eius sed demonstrant quod dupliciter de illa re potest dici quid est; sicut de puncto potest dici quid est sicut principium et ut finis, propter diversam rationem principii et finis. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no being save that of the essence, even as there is no (act of) understanding but the intellect—and therefore as in God there is but one act of understanding, so is there but one being Wherefore it can nowise be granted that in God the being of the. relations is distinct from the being of the essence. Now the definition of a thing does not signify its being but its being this or that, namely what that thing is. Wherefore two definitions of one thing do not prove that it has a twofold being, but that it can be said in two ways of that thing that it is: thus we may say of a point what it is as a beginning, and what it is as an end,. on account of the, different definitions of beginning and end. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod, cum relatio sit accidens in creaturis, esse suum est inesse; unde esse suum non est ad aliud se habere; sed esse huius secundum quod ad aliquid, est ad aliud se habere. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Since in creatures relation is an accident its being is to be in something, and. not to have a respect to some other thing: but considered as a relation its being is to have respect to something else. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod dicuntur relativa de Deo praedicari non substantialiter, quia non praedicantur per modum existentis in substantia, sed per modum ad aliud se habentis, non ideo quin illud quod significant, sit substantia. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Relatives are said not to be predicated of God substantially, because they are not predicated as something existing in a substance, but as having a respect to something else, yet not as though that which they signify were not the substance. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod Deus dicitur non eo Deus quo pater, propter diversum modum significandi divinitatis et paternitatis, ut expositum est. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God is said not to be God in the same way as Father on account of the different ways of signifying godhead and paternity, as explained above.
Do the Relations Constitute and Distinguish the Persons Or Hypostases?
[Sum. Th. I, Q. xxx, A. i: Q. xi. A. 2]
Tertio quaeritur utrum relationes constituant et distinguant personas sive hypostases. Et videtur quod non. THE third point of inquiry is whether the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons or Hypostases: and seemingly they do not. Dicit enim Augustinus: omnis res quae relative dicitur est etiam aliquid excepto relativo; sicut homo dominus, et homo servus. Sed personae in divinis dicuntur relative. Ergo sunt aliquid excepto relativo. Non ergo constituuntur per relationes: nihil enim potest esse aliquid remoto suo constitutivo. 1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i): Every relative expression signifies something besides the relation expressed: thus a master is a man, a slave is a man. Now the Persons in God are expressed relatively. Therefore they are something besides the relative term: and consequently they are not constituted by the relations: for if you remove that which constitutes a thing it is no longer a thing. Sed dicendum, quod praeter intellectum paternitatis in divinis, intelligitur pater. —Sed contra, constat quod pater etiam relative dicitur. Si ergo praeter paternitatem oportet aliquid esse in persona, quia paternitas est ad aliquid, eadem ratione praeter hoc quod dicitur pater, oportet aliquid in persona ponere quod relative dicatur. 2. It will be replied that in God that which is besides Paternity is the Father. —On the contrary it is evident that Father is also a relative term. If then through Paternity being relative the Person must contain something besides Paternity, for the same reason beside being Father the Person must contain something that is not relative. Praeterea, Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod nullo modo putandum est, patrem dici ad seipsum; sed quidquid dicitur, ad filium dicitur. Ergo idem quod prius. 3. Augustine says (ibid.) that in no sense can the Father be referred to himself, but whatsoever is said of him is in relation to the Son. Thus the same conclusion follows as before. Sed dicendum, quod illud quod pater est, relatione excepta, est essentia, —sed contra, illud quod est in relativo relatione excepta, per relationem ad aliquid refertur, sicut patet in exemplis ab ipso positis: homo enim per relationem domini refertur ad servum. Sed essentia non refertur in divinis: neque enim generat neque generatur. Ergo non potest hoc intelligi de essentia, sed de relationis supposito, cui conveniat generare vel generari. 4. One may reply that what the Father is besides the relation is the essence. —On the contrary whatsoever is in a relative besides the relation is referred to the other thing by that relation, as may be seen from the examples which he gives: thus man is related to servant by the relationship of dominion. Now the essence in God is not related, since it neither begets nor is begotten. Therefore this cannot be said of the essence but of the subject of the relation, which subject begets or is begotten. Praeterea, prius est unumquodque in se consideratum, quam ad aliud referatur. Nihil autem constituitur per id quod est eo posterius secundum intellectum. Ergo hypostasis patris non constituitur per relationem qua ad aliud refertur. 5. A thing is considered in itself before we refer it to another. Now nothing is constituted by that which comes after it in our consideration of it. Therefore the hypostasis of the Father is not constituted by its relation to something else. Praeterea, hypostases in divinis perfectiores sunt quam in rebus humanis. Sed apud nos proprietates non constituunt neque distinguunt hypostases, sed sunt signa distinctionis hypostasum constitutarum. Ergo nec in divinis relationes, quae sunt proprietates, constituunt hypostases nec distinguunt. 6. In God hypostases are more perfect than in us. But in us properties neither constitute nor distinguish hypostases, but are signs of distinction in hypostases already constituted. Therefore neither in God do the relations which are properties constitute or distinguish the hypostases. Praeterea, prius est intelligere hypostasim generantem quam ipsam generationem, cum generans intelligatur ut generationis principium, prius autem est intelligere generationem quam paternitatem: relationes enim ad actiones vel passiones sequuntur, ut in V Metaph. dicitur. Ergo prius est intelligere hypostasim patris quam paternitatem: ergo non constituitur paternitate; et eadem ratione nec hypostasis filii filiatione. 7. Logically the generating hypostasis precedes generation, since the generator is understood to be the principle of generation: and logically generation precedes Paternity, since relations follow actions or passions (Metaph. v). Therefore logically the hypostasis of the Father precedes Paternity, and consequently is not constituted by it, as neither is the hypostasis of the Son by Filiation. Praeterea, nulla forma constituit et distinguit nisi in genere suo, sicut albedo constituit et distinguit secundum qualitatem album a nigro: et similiter longitudo constituit aliquid et distinguit in genere quantitatis. Ergo et relatio nec constituit nec distinguit nisi in genere ad aliquid. Hypostasis autem significatur in genere substantiae. Relatio ergo nec distinguit nec constituit hypostasim. 8. No form is constituted or distinctive outside its own genus; thus whiteness constitutes and distinguishes a white from a black thing in point of quality: likewise length constitutes and differentiates a thing in point of quantity. Therefore neither is relation constitutive or distinctive outside the genus of relation. But a hypostasis belongs to the genus of substance. Therefore relation neither constitutes nor distinguishes the hypostasis. Praeterea, relatio in divinis est divina essentia. Si ergo constituit et distinguit hypostasim, aut hoc est in quantum est substantia divina, aut in quantum est relatio. Non in quantum est essentia divina: quia essentia divina, cum sit communis tribus personis, non potest esse distinctionis principium. Similiter etiam nec in quantum est relatio: quia secundum relationem non significatur aliquid per se existens, quod significat nomen hypostasis, sed solum ut ad aliquid dictum. Ergo relatio nullo modo distinguit vel constituit hypostasim. 9. In God relation is the divine essence: wherefore if it constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis, this is either qua the divine substance or qua relation. Not, however, qua divine essence, because since this is common to the three Persons it cannot be the principle of their distinction: nor again qua relation, because relation does not signify anything self-subsistent I which is the meaning of the word hypostasis, but merely reference to another. Therefore relation nowise distinguishes or constitutes the hypostasis. Praeterea, nihil constituit et distinguit seipsum in divinis. Relationes autem sunt ipsae hypostases: sicut enim non differunt divinitas et Deus, ita nec paternitas et pater. Ergo relationes non constituunt nec distinguunt hypostases. 10. In God nothing constitutes or distinguishes itself. Now the relations are themselves the hypostases: for just as Godhead and God do not differ, so neither do Paternity and Father. Therefore the relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases. Praeterea, non est quaerendum de aliquibus duobus quo distinguantur nisi in aliquo conveniant, quo, aliquo superveniente, distinguantur in utroque, sicut animal commune est homini et equo; distinguitur autem animal rationali et irrationali differentiis additis: et ideo quaerere possumus quomodo homo ab equo distinguatur. Quae autem in nullo conveniunt, quo possint modo praedicto distingui, seipsis distinguuntur, et non aliquo distinguente. Sed duae hypostases in divinis non conveniunt nisi in essentia, quae nullo modo relatione distinguitur. Ergo non est dicendum, quod hypostases relationibus distinguantur, sed quod distinguantur seipsis. 11. One should not ask how two things are distinct unless they have something in common which is distinguished by something added in each of them: thus animal is common to man and horse, and is distinguished as rational and irrational by the addition of differences: wherefore we may ask how man and horse differ. Whereas things which have nothing in common so as to be distinguished in the foregoing manner are distinct by themselves and not by any distinguishing principle. Now two divine hypostases have nothing common but the essence, and this is not in any way distinguished by relations. Therefore it should be said not that the hypostases are distinguished by the relations, but that they are distinct by themselves. Praeterea, nihil causat quod praesupponit. Sed relatio praesupponit distinctionem: relatione enim ad aliud res refertur; alietas autem distinctionem importat. Ergo relatio non potest esse distinctionis principium. 12. Nothing causes what it presupposes. But relation presupposes distinction, since thereby one thing is referred to another, and otherness implies distinction. Therefore relation cannot be a principle of distinction. Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore dicit, quod hypostases in Angelis distinguuntur sola qualitate, in divinis autem sola origine. Origo autem secundum intellectum differt a relatione, sicut generatio a paternitate. Ergo hypostases divinae non distinguuntur relatione sed origine. 13. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 15) says that in the angels the hypostases are distinguished by quality alone, and in God by origin alone. Now origin differs logically from relation, as generation from Paternity. Therefore the hypostases are distinguished not by relation but by origin. Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, hypostases divinae suis proprietatibus distinguuntur. Sed proprietas patris est genuisse filium, ut Augustinus; et proprietas filii est quod nascatur a patre. Ergo generatione et nativitate pater et filius distinguuntur. Haec autem significant originem. Ergo pater et filius distinguuntur origine et non relatione. 14. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 7) the divine hypostases are distinguished by their properties. Now it is the property of the Father that he begot the Son, according to Augustine, and of the Son that he is born of the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by generation and birth. But these denote origin, therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by origin and not by relation. Praeterea, quaedam relationes sunt in divinis quae nec hypostases constituunt nec distinguunt, ut aequalitas et similitudo. Ergo nec aliae relationes, ut paternitas et filiatio, distinguunt et constituunt hypostasim. 15. There are some relations in God which neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, such as equality and likeness. Therefore neither do the other relations, such as Paternity and Filiation, constitute and distinguish the hypostases. Sed contra. Est quod Boetius dicit, quod sola relatio in divinis multiplicat Trinitatem. Multitudo autem Trinitatis constituitur per hypostases constitutas et distinctas. Ergo sola relatio constituit et distinguit personas et hypostases. On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now multitude in the Trinity: arises from constituted and distinct hypostases. Therefore relation alone constitutes the Persons and hypostases. Praeterea, illis solis aliqua distinguuntur quae non communiter de eis praedicantur. Sed sola relativa singillatim praedicantur de personis divinis et non communiter ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo solum relationibus personae et hypostases in divinis distinguuntur. Moreover things are distinguished only by what is not predicated of them in common. Now the relations alone are predicated of the divine Persons severally and not in common according to Augustine (De Trin. v, 8). Therefore the Persons and hypostases in God are distinguished by the relations alone. Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hoc sunt duae opiniones: quarum prima est, quod relationes in divinis non constituunt hypostases, nec distinguunt, sed distinctas et constitutas ostendunt. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum, quod hoc nomen hypostasis significat substantiam individuam, id est quae non potest de pluribus praedicari. Unde genera et species in praedicamento substantiae, ut homo et animal, non possunt dici hypostases, quia de pluribus praedicantur; Socrates vero et Plato dicuntur hypostases, quia praedicantur de uno solo. Si ergo in divinis Trinitas personarum non supponeretur, ut ponunt Iudaei et Pagani, non oporteret in divinis aliquid aliud constitutivum et distinctivum hypostasis inquirere, nisi solam essentiam divinam. Deus enim per essentiam suam est aliquid in se indivisum, et ab omnibus quae non sunt Deus, distinctum. Sed quia fides Catholica ponit unam essentiam in tribus personis, non potest intelligi divina essentia ut distinctiva et constitutiva hypostasis in divinis. Divinitate enim intelligitur constitui Deus quod est commune tribus personis et ita significatur ut dictum de pluribus, et non ut hypostasis incommunicabilis. Et eadem ratione nihil quod dicitur absolute de Deo, potest intelligi ut distinctivum et constitutivum hypostasis in personis, cum ea quae absolute dicuntur de Deo, significentur per modum essentiae. Oportet ergo ponere distinctivum et constitutivum hypostasis in divinis id quod primo invenitur non de pluribus dici, sed uni soli convenire. Talia autem sunt duo, relatio et origo, et generatio et paternitas, sive nativitas et filiatio, quae licet in Deo idem sint secundum rem, differunt tamen ratione et modo significandi. Primum autem horum est origo secundum intellectum, nam relatio ad originem sequi videtur. Et ideo ponit haec opinio, quod hypostases in divinis constituantur et distinguantur origine, secundum quod significatur cum dicitur, qui est ab alio, et a quo alius; et quod relatio paternitatis et filiationis secundum intellectum consequatur ad constitutionem et distinctionem personarum, et quod per eas distinctio et constitutio hypostasum ostendatur. Ex hoc enim quod dicitur pater, ostenditur quod sit a quo alius: per hoc vero quod dicitur filius, ostenditur quod sit ab alio. Nec tamen oportet secundum hanc opinionem dicere, quod hypostases divinae, si non distinguuntur relationibus, distinguantur per aliqua absoluta: quia ipsae origines relationem important; sicut enim pater dicitur ad filium, ita generans ad generatum. I answer that there are two opinions on this question. The first is that in God relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, but show that they are constituted and distinct. In order to elucidate the point it must be observed that this word hypostasis denotes an individual substance, one to wit that cannot be predicated of several. Hence genera and species in the predicament of substance, such as man or animal, cannot be called hypostases, since they are predicated of several: whereas Socrates and Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only. Accordingly if, as Jews and pagans assert, there is no Trinity in God, there is no need to ask what constitutes or distinguishes the hypostasis since this is nothing but the divine essence: because by his very essence God is something undivided in itself, and distinct from all things that are not God. Seeing, however, that the Catholic Faith teaches that there is one essence in three Persons, it is inconceivable that the divine essence distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in God: because we understand the Godhead as constituting God, and as common to the three Persons and therefore as predicated of several subjects and not as an incommunicable hypostasis. In like manner nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the Persons, since what is predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential. Wherefore that which constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis in the divine Persons must be that which before anything else is not predicated of several but exclusively of one. Now there are two things that fulfill this condition, relation and origin, and generation and Paternity (or birth and Filiation), which although they are really but one thing in God, differ nevertheless logically and in their mode of signification. Logically the first of these is origin, for relation seemingly follows origin. Wherefore this opinion holds that the divine hypostases are constituted and distinguished by their origin, and this is indicated when we say A is from B, and from B is A: and that the relations of Paternity and Filiation logically follow the constitution and distinction of the Persons, and indicate the constitution and distinction of the hypostases. Thug, the fact that one is called Father shows that another originates from him: and the fact that one is called Son shows that he originates from another. Nor does it follow from this opinion that the divine hypostases, if not distinguished by their relations, are distinguished by something absolute, since the origins themselves imply relation: seeing that as father denotes relationship to a son, so does begetter. to one begotten. Sed haec opinio non videtur convenienter posse stare. Distinctivum enim et constitutivum hypostasis potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quo distinguitur et constituitur formaliter, sicut homo humanitate, et Socrates Socrateitate. Alio modo quo distinguitur et constituitur quasi via ad distinctionem et constitutionem; sicut si diceremus quod Socrates est homo sua generatione, quae est via ad formam, qua formaliter constituitur. Patet ergo quod origo alicuius non potest intelligi ut constitutiva et distinctiva eius, nisi propter hoc quod formaliter constituit et distinguit. Si enim generatione non induceretur humanitas, nunquam generatione constitueretur homo. Impossibile est ergo dici, quod hypostasis filii constituatur sua nativitate, nisi in quantum intelligitur quod nativitas eius terminatur ad aliquid quod formaliter constituit. Ipsa autem relatio ad quam terminatur nativitas, est filiatio. Oportet ergo quod filiatio sit formaliter constituens et distinguens hypostasim filii, non autem origo, neque relatio intellecta in origine: quia relatio intellecta in origine, sicut et ipsa origo, non significat aliquid adhuc subsistens in natura, sed in naturam tendens. Et quia omnium hypostasum eiusdem naturae est eadem ratio constitutionis et distinctionis, ideo similiter oportet ex parte patris intelligere quod hypostasis patris constituatur et distinguatur ipsa paternitate; non autem generatione activa, neque relatione inclusa. Nevertheless this opinion seemingly is void of foundation. For a thing may be understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is constituted by humanity, and Socrates by ‘socrateity’: or it may be taken for the way as it were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then that a thing’s origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation. Consequently it cannot be said that the hypostasis of the Son is constituted by its nativity, except in so far as we take its nativity as terminating in something whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted. Now the relation in which nativity terminates is filiation. Therefore the hypostasis of the Son must be formally constituted and distinguished by Filiation and not by its origin: nor by the relation implied in the origin, since the relation implied in the origin like the origin itself denotes something not as yet subsistent in the nature but as tending thereto. And since all hypostases of the same nature have the same constitutive and distinguishing principle, it follows that in like manner on the part of the Father we must understand that the hypostasis of the Father is constituted and distinguished by Paternity, and not by active generation nor by the relation implied thereby. Et haec est secunda opinio, quod relationes constituunt et distinguunt personas et hypostases. Quod hoc modo potest intelligi: paternitas enim est ipsa divina essentia ut probatum est; et pari ratione pater est idem quod Deus. Paternitas ergo constituendo patrem, constituit Deum. Et sicut paternitas, licet sit essentia divina, tamen non est communis sicut essentia, ita pater licet sit idipsum quod Deus, non tamen est commune ut Deus, sed proprium. Pater ergo, Deus in quantum est Deus, est commune habens naturam divinam, et in quantum est pater, est proprium ab aliis distinctum. Unde est hypostasis, quae significat subsistens in natura aliqua, distincta ab aliis. Et per hunc modum paternitas constituendo patrem, constituit hypostasim. This is the second opinion, namely that the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons and hypostases: and it may be explained as follows. As already proved, Paternity is the same as the divine essence: and likewise the Father is the same as God: wherefore Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes God. And just as Paternity, although it is the divine essence, is not common as the essence is: even so although the Father is the very same thing as God, he is not common as God is, but proper. Accordingly God the Father as God is something common as having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other Persons. Hence he is a hypostasis, which signifies that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others: so that Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes the hypostasis. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod personae divinae sunt aliquid, excepto relativo; et hoc aliquid est essentia, quae relative non dicitur. Sic enim intelligit Augustinus, ut verba eius diligenter inspicienti ostendunt. Reply to the First Objection. The divine Persons are something besides a relation: this is the essence which is not spoken of relatively. This is what Augustine means to say as may be seen by studying his words carefully. Unde concedimus secundum et tertium. Hence we grant the Second and Third Objections. Ad quartum dicendum, quod relatio etsi de essentia divina non dicatur per modum informationis, dicitur tamen per modum identitatis: si enim non dicamus, quod essentia sit generans vel relata, dicimus tamen, quod ipsa est generatio et relatio. Sed tamen de nominibus essentialibus in concreto significatis relativa dicuntur, etiam per modum informationis: dicimus enim quod Deus generat Deum et quod Deus refertur ad Deum, eo quod idem suppositum intelligitur et relationis et essentiae,- ut ostensum est,- quamvis ipsa essentialia non distinguantur. Et ita remotis relativis, intelliguntur nomina essentialia concreta, non distincta, quae per relationes relative dicuntur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although relation is not attributed to the essence as though it were a form, it is attributed to it as identical with it. For even if we do not say that the essence begets or is related, we do say that it is a generation and relation. However, relative terms are predicated of the essential names in the concrete even by way of information: thus we say that God begets God, and that God is related to God, inasmuch as relation and essence are understood as having a common supposit, as we have shown: although the essential names themselves are not distinct. Wherefore apart from the relative terms the essential names are understood in the concrete, since through the relations they have a relative signification. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in qualibet hypostasi divina est id quod absolute dicitur, quod ad essentiam pertinet; et hoc secundum modum intelligendi prius est eo quod ad aliquid dicitur in divinis. Id tamen quod absolute dicitur, cum sit commune, ad hypostasum distinctionem non pertinet; unde non sequitur quod prius sit intelligere hypostasim distinctam quam relationem eius. Reply to the Fifth Objection. In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation. Ad sextum dicendum, quod in rebus inferioribus hypostases per essentiam distinguuntur; et ideo proprietates quae essentiam consequuntur, non possunt esse distinctionis principium, sed magis distinctionis signum. Hypostases autem divinae nullo modo distinguuntur secundum essentiam; unde oportet quod proprietates sint principium distinctionis in eis. Reply to the Sixth Objection. In lower things hypostases are distinct in essence, so that the properties which result from the essence cannot be the principle of distinction, but are signs thereof. But the divine hypostases are nowise distinct in essence wherefore the properties must be the principle of this distinction. Ad septimum dicendum, quod de ratione hypostasis duo necesse est esse: quorum primum est quod sit per se subsistens et in se indivisa; secundum est quod sit distincta ab aliis hypostasibus eiusdem naturae. Si tamen contingat in eadem natura alias hypostases non esse, nihilominus hypostasis erit, sicut Adam, quando non erant aliae hypostases in humana natura. Semper ergo necessarium est intelligere hypostasim generantem ante generationem, quantum ad id quod hypostasis subsistit in se una existens, non tamen in quantum est ab aliis hypostasibus eiusdem naturae distincta, si per solam huiusmodi generationem aliae hypostases eiusdem naturae originentur; sicut Adam non fuit distinctus ab aliis hypostasibus eiusdem naturae priusquam mulier ex eius costa formaretur et eius filii ab eo propagarentur. In divinis autem non multiplicantur hypostases nisi per processionem aliarum personarum ab una. Prius ergo est intelligere hypostasim patris, in quantum est subsistens, quam generationem; non tamen in quantum est distincta ab aliis hypostasibus eiusdem naturae, quae non procedunt nisi hac generatione supposita. Relationes autem in divinis etsi constituant hypostases, et sic faciant eas subsistentes, hoc tamen faciunt in quantum sunt essentia divina: relatio enim, in quantum est relatio, non habet quod subsistat vel subsistere faciat; hoc enim solius substantiae est. Distinguunt vero relationes, in quantum relationes sunt: sic enim oppositionem habent. Relinquitur ergo quod ipsa paternitatis relatio, in quantum est constituens hypostasim patris, quod habet in quantum est idem substantiae divinae, praeintelligatur generationi; secundum vero quod distinguit, sic generatio paternitati praeintelligitur. Ex parte vero filii nulla remanet difficultas, nam nativitas secundum intellectum praecedit hypostasim nati, cum intelligatur ut via ad ipsam: est enim generatio via in substantiam. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Two things are requisite to constitute a hypostasis. First it must be self-subsistent and undivided in itself: secondly it must be distinct from other hypostases of the same nature. If, however, there be no other hypostases of the same nature it will still be a hypostasis, even as Adam when there were not as yet other hypostases in human nature. Hence the generating hypostasis must always be presupposed to generation, insofar as it is self-subsistent and undivided in itself, but not as distinct from other hypostases of the same nature, if other hypostases of the same nature originate solely by this kind of generation: thus Adam was not distinct from other hypostases of the same nature before the formation of the woman from his rib, and the birth of his children. But in God the hypostases are not multiplied except by the procession of the other Persons from one. Wherefore we understand the Person of the Father as subsistent before we understand him as begetting, and not as distinct from the other hypostases of the same nature which do not proceed unless we presuppose this generation. And although the divine relations constitute the hypostases and thus make them subsistent, they do this inasmuch as they are the divine essence: because a relation as such neither has nor can give subsistence, for this belongs to a substance alone. On the other hand the relations as such distinguish, for it is as such that they are mutually opposed. It follows then that the relation of Paternity, inasmuch as it constitutes the hypostasis of the Father (which it does as identical with the divine substance) is presupposed to generation, but inasmuch as it distinguishes, generation is presupposed to Paternity. As regards the Son there is no further difficulty: because birth logically precedes the hypostasis of the one born, for we conceive it as the way to it: since generation is the way to substance. Ad octavum dicendum, quod, sicut iam dictum est, relatio in divinis non solum est relatio, sed est secundum rem ipsamet divina substantia; et ideo potest constituere aliquid subsistens, et non solum aliquid relativum. Reply to the Eighth Objection. As we have already stated in God relation is something besides relation; for it is God’s very substance in reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely relative. Ad nonum dicendum, quod relatio, ut dictum est, distinguit in quantum est relatio; constituit autem hypostasim in quantum est divina essentia, et utrumque facit in quantum est divina essentia et relatio. Reply to the Ninth Objection. As already stated relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis: while as identical with the divine essence it constitutes the hypostasis, and does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence. Ad decimum dicendum, quod abstractum et concretum in divinis non differunt secundum rem, cum in Deo non sit accidens neque materia, sed solum secundum modum significandi; ex quo modo procedit quod intelligimus divinitatem ut constituentem Deum, et Deum ut habentem deitatem; et similiter est de paternitate et patre: nam licet sint idem secundum rem, differunt tamen secundum modum significandi. Reply to the Tenth Objection. In God the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is neither accident nor matter: they differ only in their manner of signification, inasmuch as we understand the Godhead as constituting God and God as having Godhead: the same applies to Paternity and the Father, for though they are really the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet in divinis convenientia secundum rem sit in sola unitate essentiae, tamen convenientia secundum rationem attenditur in divinis personis in hoc ipso quod est essentiae supponi. Quae quidem communitas significatur in omnibus essentialibus concretis, quae important suppositum esse in communi: sicut Deus est habens divinitatem. Hoc ergo ipsum quod est esse suppositum divinae naturae, commune est tribus personis communitate rationis, licet tres personae non sint unum suppositum, sed tria; sicut Socrates et Plato sunt duo homines licet esse hominem sit eis commune secundum rationem. Differentia autem quaeritur non solum in illis in quibus est aliquid commune secundum rem, sed in quibus est aliquid commune secundum rationem. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although in God nothing is really common save the one essence, there is a logical community in the divine Persons in the fact that each is a supposit of the essence. This community is indicated in all concrete essential names, that signify the supposit in general: for instance, God is one who has the Godhead. Accordingly it is logically common to the three Persons to be a supposit of the divine nature, although the three Persons are not one supposit, but three: even as Socrates and Plato are two men although it is logically common to them to be a man. Now a difference is sought not only in things that have something real in common, but even in those that have something in common logically. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod relatio praesupponit distinctionem aliorum generum, utpote substantiae et quantitatis, —quandoque etiam actionis et passionis— sed distinctionem, quae est secundum ad aliquid, relatio non supponit, sed facit; sicut relatio dupli praesupponit diversitatem magni et parvi; hanc autem differentiam quae est secundum duplum et dimidium, non praesupponit, sed facit. In divinis autem non est alia distinctio nisi secundum relationem. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Relation presupposes the distinction of the other genera such as substance and quantity; and sometimes also of action and passion: whereas it does not presuppose but causes the distinction arising from towardness: thus the relation of double presupposes the relation of great and small, whereas it does not presuppose but causes the relation of 2 to 1. In God, however, there is no other than relative distinction. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod origine dicit Richardus distingui personas, in quantum distinguuntur per relationes originis. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Richard says that the Persons are distinct by their origin, inasmuch as they are distinguished by relations of origin. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod Augustinus pro eodem accipit genuisse filium et esse patrem; et ideo utitur quandoque origine pro relatione. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine uses the words begot the Son and is the Father as having the same meaning: wherefore he sometimes speaks of origin instead of relation. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod relatio similitudinis et aequalitatis non possunt distinctionem personarum causare, sed magis ipsam praesupponunt. Est autem similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas, et similiter aequalitas est rerum distinctarum eadem quantitas. Et sic patet quod distinctio suppositorum praesupponitur et similitudini et aequalitati. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The relations of equality and likeness cannot cause a distinction of Persons in God, rather do they presuppose it. Likeness is sameness of quality in things that differ, and equality is sameness of quantity in things that are distinct. Thus it is clear that distinction of supposits is presupposed to both likeness and equality.
If Mental Abstraction Be Made of the Relations, Do the Divine Hypostases Remain?
[Sum. Th. I, Q. xl, A. 3]
Quarto quaeritur utrum remota relatione secundum intellectum, remaneat hypostasis in divinis.2 Et videtur quod sic. THE fourth point of inquiry is whether if we make mental abstraction of the relations the divine hypostases remain, and it would seem that they do remain. Ea enim quae sunt in creaturis, sunt exemplata ab his quae sunt in Deo. Sed in humanis, remotis relationibus et proprietatibus hypostasis, adhuc remanent hypostases. Ergo et similiter in divinis. 1. In the created world everything is made to a likeness of what is in God. Now if we make abstraction of the relations and properties of the human hypostasis there still remains the hypostasis. Therefore the same applies to God. Praeterea, pater non habet ab eodem quod sit quis et quod sit pater, cum etiam filius sit quis et non sit pater. Remoto ergo a patre quod sit pater, remanet quod sit quis. Est autem quis in quantum est hypostasis. Remota ergo paternitate per intellectum, adhuc remanet hypostasis patris. 2. It is not owing to the same reason that the Father is someone and that he is the Father: for the Son also is someone and yet he is not the Father. Hence if we remove Paternity from the Father he is still someone. Now he is someone inasmuch as he is a hypostasis. Therefore if we remove Paternity by mental abstraction, the hypostasis of the Father still remains. Praeterea, cum quaelibet res intelligatur per suam definitionem, potest unaquaeque res intelligi remoto eo quod in eius definitione non ponitur. Sed relatio non ponitur in definitione hypostasis. Ergo remota relatione adhuc intelligitur hypostasis. 3. Seeing that we understand a thing through its definition, we can understand anything even if abstraction be made of what is not included in its definition. Now relation is not included in the definition of a hypostasis. Therefore we can make abstraction of the relation and still understand the hypostasis. Praeterea, Iudaei et gentiles intelligunt in Deo hypostasim: intelligunt enim Deum esse rem quamdam per se subsistentem, nec tamen intelligunt in eo paternitatem et filiationem, et huiusmodi relationes. Ergo remotis huiusmodi relationibus per intellectum, remanent adhuc hypostases in divinis. 4. Jews and heathens understand that there is a hypostasis in God, for they conceive him to be a self-subsistent being: yet they do not understand Paternity, Filiation and like relations in him. Therefore if we make abstraction of such relations the hypostases still remain in God. Praeterea, omne quod se habet ex additione, remota additione, remanet id cui fit additio; sicut homo addit supra animal rationale: est enim homo animal rationale; unde remoto rationale, remanet animal. Sed persona addit proprietatem supra hypostasim: est enim persona hypostasis proprietate distincta, ad dignitatem pertinente. Ergo remota proprietate a persona secundum intellectum, remanet hypostasis. 5. That to which anything is added remains when the addition is removed: thus man adds rational to animal (since man is a rational animal): wherefore if we remove rational, animal remains. Now Person adds a property to hypostasis: for person signifies a “hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity.” Therefore if by abstraction we remove property from the Person, the hypostasis remains. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod verbum est sapientia genita. Sapientia vero hypostasim supponit, genitum autem proprietatem. Remoto ergo a verbo quod sit genitum, remanet hypostasis verbi, et eadem ratione in aliis personis. 6. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2) that the Word is begotten Wisdom. Now wisdom presupposes the hypostasis and begotten presupposes the property. Therefore if we remove from the Word that he is begotten, his hypostasis still remains: and the same applies to the other Persons. Praeterea, remota paternitate et filiatione secundum intellectum, adhuc remanet in divinis qui ab alio, et a quo alius. Haec autem hypostases designant. Ergo remotis relationibus, adhuc remanent hypostases in divinis. 7. If we make abstraction, of Paternity and Filiation there still remain in God the One (proceeding) from another and One from whom another (proceeds). But these denote the hypostases. Therefore abstraction being made of the relations the hypostases remain in God. Praeterea, remota differentia constitutiva, adhuc remanet genus. Sed proprietates personales, cum constituant personas, sunt in divinis sicut differentiae constitutivae. Ergo remotis proprietatibus, remanet genus personae, quod est hypostasis. 8. Though the constituent difference be removed the genus remains. Now the personal properties by constituting the Persons are in God as constituent differences. Therefore if these properties be removed, the genus person or hypostasis remains. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod remoto hoc quod est pater, adhuc remanet ingenitus. Sed ingenitus est quaedam proprietas cuius suppositum esse non potest nisi hypostasis. Ergo remota paternitate, adhuc remanet hypostasis patris. 9. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6) that if we remove the fact that (this Person) is the Father, it still remains that he is unbegotten. Now unbegotten is a property that can have no other subject but a hypostasis. Therefore if we make abstraction of Paternity, the hypostasis of the Father still remains. Praeterea, sicut relationes sunt proprietates hypostasum, ita attributa sunt proprietates essentiae. Sed remoto per intellectum attributo essentiali, adhuc remanet intellectus divinae substantiae. Boetius enim dicit quod remota bonitate a Deo per intellectum, adhuc remanet quod sit Deus. Ergo similiter remotis relationibus, adhuc remanent hypostases in divinis. 10. As the relations are properties of the hypostases, so are the attributes properties of the essence. Now if we make abstraction of an essential attribute we still conceive the divine substance: thus Boethius says (De Hebd.) that if by abstraction we remove goodness from God, it still remains that he is God. Therefore in like manner if we remove the relations, the hypostases; still remain in God. Praeterea, secundum Boetium, proprium est intellectus, coniuncta secundum naturam dividere. Proprietas autem et hypostasis sunt realiter coniuncta in Deo. Ergo intellectus potest ea ab invicem separare. 11. According to Boethius (Super Proem. Porphyr. in Praed.) it is proper to the intellect to separate things that are naturally united. Now property and hypostasis are really united in God. Therefore the intellect can separate them. Praeterea, remoto eo quod est in aliquo, potest intelligi id in quo est; sicut remoto accidente potest intelligi subiectum. Sed relationes ponuntur in divinis hypostasibus esse. Ergo remotis relationibus secundum intellectum, adhuc remanent hypostases. 12. It is possible to conceive a thing after removing what it contains: thus we can conceive a subject after an accident has been removed from it. Now the divine relations are said to be in the hypostases. Therefore after the relations have been removed by abstraction the hypostases remain. Sed contra. In divinis distinctio non potest esse nisi secundum relationes. Sed hypostasis dicit aliquid distinctum. Ergo remotis relationibus non remanet hypostasis. Cum enim in divinis non ponantur nisi duo modi praedicandi, scilicet secundum substantiam, et ad aliquid, remotis relationibus non remanent nisi ea quae ponuntur secundum substantiam. Haec autem sunt quae pertinent ad essentiam; et sic non remanent hypostases distinctae. On the contrary, in God no distinction is possible except by the relations. Now the hypostasis denotes something distinct. Therefore the hypostases do not remain if the relations be removed. For seeing that in God there are only two modes of predication, namely substantive and relative, if the relations be removed nothing remains to be predicated except substantively: and such are things that regard the essence, so that the hypostases will no longer be distinct. Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quidam posuerunt hypostases in divinis non constitui nec distingui relationibus, sed per solam originem. Relationes autem dicebant consequi ipsam originem personarum, sicut originis terminos, quibus complementum originis designatur, et sic ad quamdam dignitatem pertinent. Unde cum persona videatur esse nomen dignitatis, intellectis huiusmodi relationibus supra hypostases, dicebant constitui personas; et sic huiusmodi relationes dicebant esse constitutivas personarum, sed non hypostasum. Et pro tanto apud quosdam huiusmodi relationes personalitates dicuntur; et ideo sicut apud nos, remotis ab aliquo homine his quae ad dignitatem pertinent, quae faciunt eum esse personam, remanet eius hypostasis, ita in divinis, remotis per intellectum huiusmodi relationibus personalibus a personis, dicunt, quod remanebant hypostases, non tamen personae. Sed quia iam supra ostensum est quod relationes praedictae et hypostases constituunt et distinguunt, ideo secundum alios dicendum est, quod remotis per intellectum huiusmodi relationibus, sicut non remanent personae, ita non remanent hypostases. Remoto enim eo quod est constitutivum alicuius, non potest remanere id quod per ipsum constituitur. I answer that as stated above (A. 3) some have contended that in God the hypostases are not constituted or distinguished by the relations but only by their origin. And ,they held relation to be consequent to the origin of the Person as terminating and completing it, so as to indicate a certain dignity. Wherefore since person is thought to denote dignity, they said that the hypostasis with the added relation is conceived to constitute the Person; and thus they held the relations to constitute the Person and not the hypostasis. In this sense it is customary with some to call these relations Personalities: and consequently just as with us if we remove from a man that which pertains to dignity and makes him a person, his hypostasis remains, even so in God if we mentally abstract these personal relations from the Persons they say that the hypostases but not the Persons will remain. Seeing, however, that as we have proved above (A. 3) these relations both constitute and distinguish the hypostases, we must hold the contrary opinion that abstraction being made of these relations neither the Persons nor the hypostases remain: because if the constituents of a thing be removed the thing itself cannot remain. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in hominibus hypostases non constituuntur neque per relationes neque per proprietates, sicut constituuntur in divinis, ut ostensum est; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the First Objection. Neither relations nor properties constitute the human hypostasis, whereas we have proved that they constitute the divine hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails. Ad secundum dicendum, quod pater ab eodem habet quod sit quis et quod sit pater: ab eodem, inquam, secundum rem, et non secundum rationem, sed differenti secundum rationem, vel sicut differt generale a speciali, vel commune a proprio: sicut patet quod homo ab eadem forma substantiali habet quod sit animal et quod sit homo; non enim sunt unius rei plures formae substantiales secundum rem diversae: et tamen ab anima, inquantum est anima sensibilis, tantum habet quod sit animal; inquantum vero est anima sensibilis et rationalis, habet ab ea quod sit homo. Et propter hoc et equus est animal, sed non est homo, quia non habet animam sensibilem eamdem numero quam habet homo: et pro tanto etiam non est idem animal numero. Similiter dico in proposito, quod pater habet quod sit quis et quod sit pater a relatione; sed quod sit quis, habet a relatione communiter sumpta; quod autem sit hic quis, habet ab hac relatione quae est paternitas; et propter hoc etiam filius, in quo est relatio, sed non haec relatio quae est paternitas, est quis, sed non est hic quis qui est pater. Reply to the Second Objection. From the same cause the Father is someone and is the Father: the same that is, really and not only logically, yet with a logical distinction, either as that of generic and specific, or of common and proper. Thus it is plain that from the same form man is an animal and, is a man (since one thing has not several actually distinct substantial forms): yet from his soul inasmuch as it is a sensible soul, he is only an animal, and from his soul as both sensible and rational, he is a man. Hence a horse is an animal but is not a man; because its sensible soul is not the same sensible soul as that of a man, and for that reason it is not the same individual animal as a man. The same applies to the question in point. The Father is someone and is the Father on account of the relation: but he is someone on account of the relation considered in general: while that he is a particular someone is due to this particular relation which is Paternity. For this reason again the Son, in whom is a relation, but not the relation of Paternity, is someone, but he is not that particular someone that is the Father. Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid in relatione alicuius potest poni dupliciter: scilicet explicite, sive in actu, et implicite sive in potentia. In ratione enim animalis non ponitur anima rationalis explicite et in actu, quia sic omne animal haberet animam rationalem; sed implicite et in potentia, quia animal est substantia animata sensibilis. Sicut autem sub anima in potentia continetur anima rationalis, ita sub animato rationale: et ideo quando definitio animalis actu attribuitur homini, oportet quod rationale sit de definitione animalis explicite, secundum quod animal est idem homini. Et similiter est in proposito; hypostasis enim, communiter sumpta, est substantia distincta: unde cum in divinis non possit esse distinctio nisi per relationem, cum dico hypostasim divinam, oportet quod intelligatur relatione distincta. Et ita relatio, quamvis non cadat in definitione hypostasis quod est homo, cadit tamen in definitione hypostasis divinae. Reply to the Third Objection. The definition of a thing may include something in two ways: explicitly, i.e. actually, or implicitly, i.e. potentially. The definition of an animal does not include the rational soul explicitly and actually, for then every animal would have a rational soul: but it includes it implicitly and potentially, because an animal is a sensible animate substance. Now just as soul includes rational soul potentially, so does animated being contain rational being potentially: so that where the definition of animal is actually applied to man, rational must be included in the definition of animal explicitly, for as much as animal is the same as man. It is thus in the case in point: for hypostasis considered in general is a distinct substance, wherefore since there can be no distinction in God except by reason of relation, when I say ‘divine hypostasis’ it must of necessity be conceived as distinct by reason of a relation. Hence although relation is not included in the definition of the hypostasis that is a man, it is included in the definition of a divine hypostasis. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Iudaei et gentiles non intelligunt essentiam distinctam nisi ab his quae sunt alterius naturae, quae quidem distinctio fit per ipsam divinam essentiam. Sed apud nos hypostasis intelligitur ut distincta ab eo quod est eiusdem naturae, a quo non potest distingui nisi per relationem tantum: et ideo ratio non procedit. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Jews and heathens do not conceive the essence as distinct except from things of another nature, and such distinction arises from the divine essence itself. We, however, conceive the hypostasis as distinct from that which is of the same nature, and from which it cannot be distinguished otherwise than by relation alone. Hence the objection proves nothing. Ad quintum dicendum, quod alius est modus quo definiuntur accidentia, et quo definiuntur substantiae. Substantiae enim non definiuntur per aliquid quod sit extra essentiam eorum: unde id quod primo ponitur in definitione substantiae est genus, quod praedicatur in eo quod quid de definito. Accidens vero definitur per aliquid quod est extra essentiam eius, scilicet per subiectum, a quo secundum suum esse dependet. Unde id quod ponitur in definitione eius, loco generis, est subiectum; sicut cum dicitur: simum est nasus curvus. Sicut ergo in definitionibus substantiarum, remotis differentiis, remanet genus; ita in definitione accidentium, remoto accidente, quod ponitur loco differentiae, remanet subiectum; aliter tamen et aliter. Remota enim differentia remanet genus, sed non idem numero: remoto enim rationali, non remanet idem numero animal, quod est animal rationale; sed remoto eo quod ponitur loco differentiae in definitionibus accidentium, remanet idem subiectum numero: remoto enim curvo vel concavo, remanet idem nasus numero. Et hoc est, quia accidens non complet essentiam subiecti sicut differentia complet essentiam generis. Cum ergo dicitur: persona est hypostasis, proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente, non ponitur hypostasis in definitione personae ut subiectum, sed ut genus. Unde remota proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente, non remanet hypostasis eadem, scilicet numero vel specie, sed solum secundum genus, prout salvatur in substantiis non rationalibus. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The manner of definition differs in accidents and substances. Substances are not defined by something outside their essence: wherefore the first thing included in the definition of a substance is the genus, which is predicated essentially of the thing defined. Whereas an accident is defined by something outside its essence, namely by its subject, on which it depends for its being. Hence in its definition the subject takes the place of the genus: for instance, simous means “flat-nosed.” Accordingly just as if we remove the difference from the definition ,of a substance the genus remains, even so if we remove the accident (which takes the place of the. difference) from the definition of an accident the subject remains. There is, however, a difference. When the difference is removed the genus remains, but not identically the same: thus if we remove rational, the same identical animal which is rational animal does not remain; whereas when from the definition of an accident we remove that which takes the place of the difference the same identical subject remains, thus the same nose remains when we remove the curved or ‘pug’ shape. This is because an accident does not complete the essence of its subject as the difference completes the essence of the genus. When therefore we say, I a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity, hypostasis is included in the definition of person not as subject but as genus. Wherefore if we remove the property pertaining to dignity the hypostasis does not remain the same identically or specifically but only generically, and as applied to non-rational substances. Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: verbum est sapientia genita, ly sapientia supponit pro hypostasi, non tamen significat hypostasim; et ideo in significatione eius non clauditur proprietas, sed oportet quod addatur; sicut si dicam, quod Deus est filius genitus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. When we say, The Word is Begotten Wisdom, ‘Wisdom’ stands for the hypostasis, although it does not signify it. Hence it does not include the property in its signification, and so it is necessary to add it: thus I might say that God is the Begotten Son. Ad septimum dicendum, quod qui ab alio et a quo alius, non differunt a paternitate et a filiatione, nisi sicut commune a proprio, quia filius significat eum qui est ab alio per generationem; et pater significat eum a quo alius per generationem; nisi forte dicamus, quod a quo alius et qui ab alio, importent originem, et pater et filius relationes originis consequentes. Sed ex supradictis iam patet quod per origines non constituuntur hypostases, sed per relationes. Reply to the Seventh Objection. He that proceeds from another and he from whom another proceeds do not differ from Filiation and Paternity save as common from proper: since Son denotes him who is from another by generation, and Father signifies him from whom another is by generation: unless we contend that he who is from another and he from whom another is denote the origin, while Father and Son denote the consequent relations. But we have already made it plain that the hypostases are constituted not by their origins but by their relations. Ad octavum dicendum quod, remota differentia constitutiva, remanet genus in communi, non in eodem secundum speciem vel numerum. Reply to the Eighth Objection. After abstraction of the constituent difference, the genus remains in common but not in any species or individual. Ad nonum dicendum, quod intentio Augustini non fuit dicere: quod Deus pater remaneat ingenitus, remota paternitate, nisi forte prout ingenitus tunc importaret conditionem naturae, et non proprietatem personae. Fuit autem eius intentio ostendere quod, remota paternitate, potest remanere ingenitum in communi. Non enim oportet quod quidquid est ingenitum, sit pater. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Augustine does not mean to say that God the Father remains unbegotten if we abstract his Paternity, except perhaps in so far as unbegotten would then denote a condition of nature and not a property of the Person. His intention was to show that if we abstract the Paternity, unbegotten may still remain in general: since. it is not necessary that whatsoever is unbegotten be the Father. Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio bonitatis non constituit rationem essentiae, immo intelligitur bonum ut informativum entis; sed proprietas constituit hypostasim; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The notion of goodness does not constitute the notion of the essence, in fact good is conceived as informing being. On the other hand the property constitutes the hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet intellectus possit aliqua coniuncta dividere, non tamen omnia: non enim potest dividere illa quorum unum est de ratione alterius; non enim potest dividere animal ab homine. Proprietas autem est de ratione hypostasis, et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the mind is able to separate certain things that are united, it cannot do so in every case: for it cannot separate things one of which enters into the definition of the other; thus it cannot separate animal from man. Now property enters into the definition of the hypostasis: wherefore the objection does not prove. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod remoto eo quod est in aliquo sicut in subiecto, vel sicut in loco, remanet id in quo est; non autem remoto eo quod est in aliquo sicut pars essentiae eius. Non enim remoto rationali, remanet homo; et similiter nec remota proprietate, remanet hypostasis. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If one removes that which is in another as subject or place, that in which it was remains: but it is not so if we remove that which is part of a thing’s essence: thus man no longer remains if we remove rational: and in like manner if we remove the property, the hypostasis does not remain.