CHAPTER 6
FAITH AND REASON
6.1 The positions of the theologians
6.1.1 The Hanbalites
6.1.2 The Mu`tazilites
6.1.3 The Ash`arites
6.2 The search for truth by direct experience
6.2.1 Shī`ites
6.2.2 The Sūfīs
6.3 Al-Ghazālī and rational knowledge
6.3.1 The Iyā'
6.3.2 Ayyuhā l-walad
6.4 The Philosophers
6.4.1 Al-Kindī
6.4.2 Muḥammad ar-Rāzī
6.4.3 Ibn-Masarra
6.4.4 Al-Fārābī
6.4.5 Miskawayh
6.4.6 Ibn-Sīnā
6.4.7 Ibn-Gabirol
6.4.8 Ibn-Ṭufayl
6.4.9 Ibn-Rushd
In the Tahāfut
In Fasl al-maqāl
In al-Kashf `an manāhij al-adilla
6.4.10 Moshe ben Maimon
6.5 Thomas Aquinas
The Arab philosophers, of course, conceived of philosophy as a rational knowledge of the world, independent of theology or revelation. The theologians, for their part, were divided into different schools on the question of the possibility or validity of using philosophical concepts to explain revelation. (1)
6.1 The positions of the theologians
6.1.1 The Ḥanbalites
The followers of Ibn-Ḥanbal (see ch. 1), were fiercely attached to the idea that Sacred Scripture (the Qur'ān and the collections of Ḥadīth) is the sole authority for a Muslim. The rejected any attempt to interpret a verse of the Qur'ān in an allegorical sense or to use philosophy to explain the conditions of truth of the verse.
That explains why the Ḥanbalites attacked the philosophers and all other theological schools during the course of the ninth century.
Ḥanbalism was later developed by Ibn-Taymiyya (d. 1328), who has had a great influence up to today, especially in the theory of an Islamic society. (2) On the one hand the ideas of Ibn-Taymiyya were taken up by `Abdalwahhāb in the Arabian peninsula in the eighteenth century. Ḥanbalite Wahhābism is at the base of the present regime in Saudi Arabia, from where it spread throughout the Muslim world, especially in certain countries of Africa.
On the other hand, the Ḥanbalism of Ibn-Taymiyya influenced the modern reformism of al-Afghānī (d. 1897), of Muḥammad `Abduh (m. 1905) and Rashīd Riā (d. 1935). (3) These were university teachers without great influence on society. Yet, throwing aside decadent Ash`arite theology, they advocated a pragmatic accommodation to modern society.
The same line of thought was continued by the Pakistani Abū-l-`Alā Maudūdī (d 1979), who developed the political dimension of Islam in a more radical way. (4)
In the twentieth century these writers influence the radical movement of Muslim Brothers and the thought of the most influential of its members, Sayyid Qub. (5) Neo-Ḥanbalism is still very important in the context of contemporary radical Islam. (6)
6.1.2 The Mu`tazilites
The Mu`tazilites were not of one uniform school, but one of their common characteristics was their free use of philosophical concepts and methods.
Besides, the interpreted the Qur'ān allegorically to make it agree with their rational positions deriving from philosophy. For example, they resorted to allegorical interpretations to avoid all anthropomorphisms and to reduce all the les descriptions or names of God to a unity which did not admit of any real distinction between the attributes of God. Insisting also on the justice of God, they interpreted allegorically every verse that implied a divine determination of the events of this world.
6.1.3 The Ash`arites
Al-Ash`arī broke from the Mu`tazilites because they did not respect the literal sense of the Qur'ān, and did not offer satisfactory explanations to answer the difficulties raised by their positions. For example, in their absolute insistence on the justice of God and the free will of man they could not provide for God's omnipotence and goodness, particularly his ability or wish to pardon.
Al-Ash`arī then became a partisan of the literal interpretation of the Qur'ān, except in certain cases where this would result in impossibilities. But to explain and support his positions, al-Ash`arī did not hesitate to use all the philosophical tools at his disposal.
We can see how each of these three schools were opposed to the philosophers and to each of the other schools. Besides, opposition was not limited to universities, but it also spilt over to the streets of Baghdad and created an unstable political situation.
6.2 The search for truth by direct experience
Some Muslims found satisfaction neither in the literal interpretation of the Qur'ān, nor in the search for truth by rational methods, such as the study of law or theology or philosophy.
6.2.1 Shī`ites
Shī`ites, partisans of `Alī, considered him the first legitimate caliph by right of appointment by Muḥammad and because he was his closest relative. A Shī`ite imām has believed to have authorize directly from God. He partakes of the `iṣma (infallibility and impeccability) of the prophet.
Shī`ites see in the Qur'ān not only ambiguities which must be interpreted, but throughout, many hidden meanings. Each verse has an outward meaning (ẓāhir), which is the literal sense, and an inner meaning (bāṭin), which is allegoric or esoteric. This meaning cannot be discovered by study or reason, but only by a special enlightenment accorded to the imām, who in his turn teaches his followers.
Shī`ism then is a system somewhat like Gnosticism, based on a wisdom coming down from on high, which certain privileged people benefit from who must then direct others.
We should note that al-Fārābī and Ibn-Sīnā are much appreciated by Shī`ite rulers today, because these philosophers supported a hierarchical organization of society, where the superiors, who are the wise, enlighten the inferiors.
6.2.2 The Ṣūfīs
ṣūfism is a movement seeking a personal experience of God apart from the rituals prescribed in the Sharī`a. (7)
As a mystical movement, ṣūfism has emphasized the presence and immanence of God, to the point of entering into conflict with the religious authorities. ṣūfīs finally found acceptance in Muslim society by a compromise worked out principally by al-Ghazālī:
- They could speak of the love of God or friendship with him (this is not a theme of the Qur'ān), but they could not say that God dwells (ḥulūl) in the believer.
- They could follow the way (ṭarīqa) and practices of Sūfism to arrive at ḥaqīqa (the Truth, Reality = God) by drawing near to him, not by union, but they could not dispense themselves from the prescriptions of Sharī`a, which are never abandoned at a superior stage.
- By their mystical prayer the may well experience the wonders of the Lord, but they must not call them miracles in the proper sense, because a miracle (mu`jiza), by definition, is a proof of prophecy, which has been terminated with Muḥammad.
ṣūfism presents many facts and questions which need to be analyzed and integrated into Muslim philosophy and especially Muslim theology. But in fact, apart from efforts to safeguard orthodoxy, very little theological reflection has been made on ṣūfism, and Kalām has borrowed nothing from it.
The principal observation that should be made here, in a discussion of philosophy, is that ṣūfīs, like Shī`ites, have sought the truth by way of direct experience or divine enlightenment. But, being a movement within Sunnism, ṣūfism is distinct from Shī`ism by the fact that it is open to every Muslim without exception. The ṣūfic democratization of mystical experience was the Sunnite response to Shī`ism.
Another important observation is that ṣūfic brotherhoods are still in conflict with neo-Ḥanbalite movements, such as Wahhābism of Saudi Arabia and the followers of Sayyid ṭ in Egypt. In Africa Qutb's disciples regard ṣūfīs as syncretists who corrupt the purity of Islam. In fact, ṣūfīs are in some way the guardians of African tradition against an Arabization of culture.
6.3 Al-Ghazālī and rational knowledge
As we have seen in Chapter 1, al-Ghazālī's attacks were the principal factor in the demise of philosophy in the Muslim world. What were his views on rational knowledge in general, to explain this attitude?
On this subject al-Ghazālī composed: 1) Tahāfut al-falāsifa in 1095 before his crisis and retreat from teaching. In this book he attacked twenty philosophical theses which he qualifies as heretical (bid`a = innovation) or, more seriously, as disbelief (kufr). During his retreat he wrote 2) Iḥyā' `ulūm ad-dīn (Revivification of the sciences of religion), a large work or summa, of which Book 1, chapters 1-7 are relevant here. In the same period he wrote 3) Ayyuhā l-walad (O son!) to instruct a ṣūfī novice. After resuming teaching he wrote 4) his autobiography, al-Munqidh min aḍ-ḍalāl, which summarizes what he wrote in his preceding works. Let us look at the second and third of these works.
6.3.1 The Iḥyā'
In the Ihyā', Book 1, ch. 2, al-Ghazālī speaks of the different kinds of sciences. What exactly did science mean in the philosophical context of his time? Science (in Arabic al-`ilm, in Greek ἐπιστήμη) was a technical term for knowledge of a determined subject, an attribute which is the property of that subject (having the same extension) and the cause of that attribute, which is to be found in the nature (the form or matter) of the subject and also in external final and efficient causes. Such knowledge is demonstrative, because it is knowledge of the fact and the proper reason for the fact. Demonstration, in Aristotelian tradition, is not a means of discovery, but an analysis of knowledge already gained from experience and research.
Taking a lawyer's approach, al-Ghazālī refers to five legal categories to judge the value of different sciences. These are: 1) obligatory, 2) recommended, 3) permitted, 4) discouraged, et 5) forbidden.
Al-Ghazālī then says that each Muslim is obliged to know the practical aspects of his religion, that is: 1) the Shahāda (Lā ilāha illā llāh, Muḥammadun rasūl Allāh) without proofs or detailed explanations, 2) the rituals that everyone is obliged to carry out, and 3) what is forbidden to Muslims.
He then distinguishes four types of theoretical sciences: 1) mathematics (geometry and arithmetic), which is allowed for everyone and obligatory for some (such as the accountants of a community), 2) logic, which al-Ghazālī, has no reason for autonomous existence, but is an introductory part of Kalām, 3) natural theology (like Book XII of the Metaphysics of Aristotle), which also has no right to an independent existence but should form part of Kalām, and 4) the natural sciences. Al-Ghazālī distinguishes these into: false sciences (astrology and magic), useful sciences (medicine) and useless sciences (such as detailed science of the world). He does not mention here his objection that the natural sciences suppose the principle of natural causality, which goes against his Ash`arite theology.
The only human sciences he allows are mathematics and medicine -which in practice are indispensable. As for religious sciences, al-Ghazālī distinguishes many branches, but emphasized the greater importance of knowledge infused by God, such as the ṣūfīs experience. He concludes chapter 3 by saying: "The science that the Qur'ān brings is all science."
6.3.2 Ayyuhā l-walad
This little work is an exhortation to a sālik, a ṣūfī novice who is setting out on the road (tariqa, another word for ṣūfism). In one passage of this work he says:
What do you gain by mastering Kalām, the different opinions of Law, medicine, genealogies, poetry, astronomy, prosody, grammar and declensions, except that you waste your time and neglect God?
Al-Ghazālī continues to emphasize that what is important is action and not knowledge. Action gives a person a taste (dhawq) of reality (al-ḥaqq, or the "Truth") which can be gained only by experience and not be studying.
The sālik should know only four things: 1) correct belief (= the Shahāda), 2) good advice, and for that he needs a spiritual director (shaykh murshid), 3) how to be reconciled with those who criticize him, and 4) the Sharī`a sufficiently enough to follow the commandments of God.
The result of this mistrust of science has been pointed out in Chapter 1.
6.4 The Philosophers
6.4.1 Al-Kindī
Al-Kindī accepted all the dogmas of Islamic faith and did not try to challenge them by his philosophy. For him, philosophy is inferior to prophetic revelation, because prophecy comes suddenly, without any effort or reasoning. No philosopher could produce anything equal to the Qur'ān verses, with their wisdom and succinct and clear expression. (8) Nevertheless, he complains bitterly of his religious opponents, accusing them of pride:
They defend their false thrones which they built without merit to gain authority and to make a business out of religion. But they are the enemies of religion, because anyone who makes a business out of something is selling that thing, and anyone who sells something does not own it any more. So anyone who makes business out of religion has no religion, and should rightly be deprived of [the offices] of religion for having opposed the desire to know the truth of things and for calling this desire disbelief. (9)
6.4.2 Muḥammad ar-Rāzī
As we have seen in chapter 5, for Muḥammad ar-Rāzī, all men are equally endowed with reason, and can discover all truth by means of philosophy. Prophecy does not exist. In fact, it was a Satan that came to Muḥammad claiming to be an angel and offering him a prophetic mission, so as to create division among people and incite them to religious war. (10) Besides, the lives of the prophets were not exemplary, and what they claim as miracles are not miracles at all. (11)
It is more fitting for the wisdom of a wise God and the mercy of a merciful God to inspire all his servants with the knowledge of what is helpful or harmful in their present life and for the life to come. He should not prefer some to others; otherwise there will be conflict and dissent and they will perish. Thus he should not make some men imāms over others; otherwise each sect will believe its own imām and treat other imāms as liars and will fight the members of other sects with the sword, spreading calamity, while people perish from warfare and contention. Many people have perished in this way, as we can see. (12)
Then ar-Rāzī compares Muḥammad, the Biblical prophets, Mani and Zoroaster to show that they do not agree on any truth, and therefore they must all be false. (13)
6.4.3 Ibn-Masarra
Ibn-Masarra opens his Risāla al-i`tibār with the question whether prophecy is the only way of knowledge. He goes on to explain that God gave us an intellect to know him as he knows himself. We know him through the world, which is like a book. We also know him through the prophets; they not only tell of God's highest attributes, but also point to earthly signs of God. Prophesy starts at God's throne and goes down, whereas philosophy starts from the earth and goes up. While philosophy confirms the truth of prophecy, prophecy cannot be understood without philosophy. (14) Nevertheless, philosophers sometimes make mistakes in trying to describe the order of creation under God. Prophets in such cases correct them. (15)
6.4.4 Al-Fārābī
At the end of his Iḥsā' al-`ulūm, (16) al-Fārābī raises the question of philosophical interpretations that could be given to religious dogmas. First of all there are the theologians (the Ḥanbalites) who allow no possibility of interpretation, because the content of faith is too elevated to be scrutinized by human reason.
There are others who, when they meet something in revelation that seems contrary to reason or sense experience, do not contradict the sacred text, but give it an interpretation which is in accord with reason; but when they cannot reconcile the two, they refrain from contradicting revelation and take refuge, like the first group, in the truth of revelation which, in such a case, escapes the power of man to understand.
On the other hand, there are those who refuse to accept a dogma which contradicts reason. It happens that because of their boldness they are expelled from their religious community. For fear of that, others do not dare to express their convictions. Finally, al-Fārābī complains of fanatics who do not hesitate to use any means to persecute dissidents.
6.4.5 Miskawayh
For Miskawayh philosophy and prophecy agree on the same truths, but philosophical knowledge begins from below and rises upwards, whereas prophecy follows the opposite direction. Nevertheless, Miskawayh observes, the prophet descends to material language, a means less apt to express the truth. (17)
6.4.6 Ibn-Sīnā
The position of Ibn-Sīnā on faith and reason depends on his conception of the origin of knowledge, which is that the Agent Intellect infuses all intellectual knowledge, sometimes directly, sometimes passing through sense data or reasoning. Thus intellectual knowledge does not differ essentially from prophecy; both are received from on high. The only difference is that prophecy is always received directly. The result is as Ibn-Sīnā expresses in al-`Ilm al-ladunī:
Knowledge is of two kinds: One is revealed; the other is rational. Most rational sciences are revealed to one who has a mystical knowledge of them; most revealed sciences are intelligible to one who has a scientific knowledge of them. (18)
In ar-Risāla al-aḥḍawiyya fī l-ma`ād Ibn-Sīnā is more explicit. Revelation (ash-shar`) should use metaphoric language, since it is aimed at the masses who would not understand scientific language, as can be seen in the question of God's unity (tawḥīd). (19) "If that is true in the case of tawḥīd, how is it not also true for the other articles of faith?" (20) Although he admits that certain Qur'ān verses should be taken literally, (21) he concludes:
All we have said is to help the person who wants to be among the elite, and not the common people, since the exterior meaning of what is revealed (ash-sharā'i`) has no probative value in such questions. (22)
The conclusion of the Risāla fī aqsām al-`ulūm al-`aqliyya is that there is nothing in all the branches of science or philosophy (al-ḥikma) that is opposed to revelation. (23)
6.4.7 Ibn-Gabirol
Although he adopts an essentially Plotinian universe, Ibn-Gabirol corrects this by his Jewish faith in creation in time of the Intellect, the universal soul, universal matter, and all particular things. He only retains the Will or Logos as having no beginning in time. The Platonic Nous, which became the Agent Intellect of other philosophers, perhaps seemed to accord with the Biblical idea of Wisdom. Certainly the Christian idea of the Logos was far from the intention of Ibn-Gabirol.
6.4.8 Ibn-Ṭufayl
When Ḥayy ibn-Yaqẓān hears from Asāl an exposition of Islamic faith, the two see the perfect agreement between revelation received (al-manqūl) and what comes from reason (al-ma`qūl). (24)
But Ḥayy ibn-Yaqẓān has two objections against Islamic revelation. The first is the anthropomorphism of the Qur'ānic descriptions of God. The other is the permission that Sharī`a gives to indulge in the pleasures of this world, which turn one from the reality of God. Asāl has no answer to these objections. (25) Then Ḥayy ibn-Yaqẓān is moved to such pity for the people who follow such a law that he persuades Asāl to take him to them so that he can preach the truth to them. He does so, but the best of those people are so hard and dull in intelligence that they reject the message of Ḥayy ibn-Yaqẓān. (26)
6.4.9 Ibn-Rushd
In the Tahāfut
Ibn-Rushd wrote his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut towards 1180, answering point by point the attacks of al-Ghazālī's Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Ibn-Rushd forbids speaking of philosophical subtleties to the public, and criticizes al-Ghazālī for creating a public debate on questions which only specialists should talk about. (27)
Revelation is silent on certain subjects, allowing reason or demonstration to investigate them. (28) But philosophy has its limits, and the philosophers should not discuss the principles of revelation (mabādi' ash-shar`). Even specialists should begin by accepting revelation and undergoing training in the virtues which it teaches. Later they can move on to philosophical investigation (29)
Every prophet is a wise man (ḥakīm), but the contrary is not true. (30) Prophecy is a vision of what will happen by the nature of things. (31)
In Faṣl al-maqāl
At the same time, Ibn-Rushd wrote Faṣl al-maqāl, a legal work to defend the legitimacy and necessity of philosophy. In the first chapter of this work Ibn-Rushd states not only the legitimacy of philosophy, but even more strongly the obligation to study it, at least for some people. Various Qur'ān verses appeal to reflection and meditation on the whole of creation, (32) but the most perfect rational reflection is demonstrative knowledge. One is therefore obliged to know logic, which shows how to formulate a correct demonstration, as well as the rest of philosophy. One must also use the writings of the ancients, even if they are not Muslims, because one cannot discover all science by oneself.
Ibn-Rushd then distinguishes different kinds of people according to the level of their intelligence: 1) those who can follow a demonstration and arrive at certitude, 2) those who can reason, but only with probable arguments which lead only to opinion, and finally 3) those who cannot analyze the intelligible complexity of things, but must be content with rhetorical persuasion, which presents truth (or falsehood) by sensible images. Later Ibn-Rushd identifies these categories with: 1) the philosophers, 2) the Ash`arite and Mu`tazilite theologians, and 3) most ordinary Muslims.
It is philosophers who are capable of grasping truth in the most perfect way and it is their obligation to do so. Theologians and jurists must not impede them.
Ibn-Rushd goes on to show that philosophy and revelation are in agreement. Latin Averroists were accused of teaching "the double truth": that what is true in philosophy can be false in theology, and vice versa. But chapter 2 of Fal al-maqāl opens with the declaration that philosophical demonstrations cannot contradict Holy Scripture, because "truth is not opposed to truth, but agrees with it and bears witness to it."
Immediately afterwards, Ibn-Rushd says that in case of apparent conflict, Holy Scripture should be interpreted in an allegorical sense. He defends the legitimacy of allegorical interpretation by the example of jurists who use it all the time when one verse is in conflict with another. If can do this at the level of dialectical thought, philosophers have all the more right to use allegorical interpretation to make a verse agree with demonstrated truth. It is because the Qur'ān is written in an imaginative form that it can be interpreted in different ways, but philosophy presents the truth in an intelligible and immovable way. Yet Ibn-Rushd recognizes why ordinary people, who cannot understand a demonstration, are led to accept a literal interpretation; one should not disturb their faith, challenging this interpretation by publicizing the teachings of philosophy.
In any case, the consensus (ijmā`) of Muslims in interpreting Holy Scripture should be respected. Ijmā` is in fact the foundation of Muslim faith, because it is ijmā` that accepts the Qur'ān or Ḥadīth as revelation. But, says Ibn-Rushd, if Muslim philosophers do not agree with a position, one cannot talk of a Muslim consensus. Al-Ghazālī was wrong to accuse the philosophers of heresy (bid`a) or, more seriously, of disbelief (kufr), when there is no consensus. He was also wrong to divulge all his opinions in public, thus disturbing the faith of simple people.
Ibn-Rushd then answers the accusations of kufr (disbelief) that al-Ghazālī made against certain particular positions, such as: 1) God's knowledge of particulars; Ibn-Rushd says yes, God knows them, but because his knowledge is the cause of their existence and not the effect, as is the case with human knowledge. 2) On the duration of the world, Ibn-Rushd says that it makes no difference if one says that the world had no beginning if one admits that it depends on God for its existence. Besides, the Qur'ān nowhere explicitly says that the world had a beginning, and one can even quote verses that lead one to think that the world was created from pre-existent matter. 3) Speaking of the future life and the accusation of the philosophers' denial of the resurrection of the body, Ibn-Rushd merely says that this is still a debatable question and that a diversity of opinions is legitimate. (33)
Finally, in chapter 3 Ibn-Rushd, excuses himself for having spoken of these subjects in a public work. He was forced to do so because of the public attacks made by al-Ghazālī (then dead) which continue to be repeated by fundamentalist jurists and theologians.
In al-Kashf `an manāhij al-adilla
In this other important work Ibn-Rushd gives details about when one must not take the Qur'ān literally. Apart from the cases where the literal sense is clear and poses no problems, there are four possible cases when the text is symbolic (mithāl) of another truth:
- Where it is not evident that the text is symbolic and what it symbolizes is not evident—then the interpretation (ta'wīl) is reserved to specialists (rāsikhūn).
- Where both are evident—then everyone should accept the symbolic sense.
- Where it is evident that the text is symbolic, but what it symbolizes is not evident—then the interpretation is reserved to specialists who, when asked by others, must give explanations adapted to their understanding.
- Where it is not evident that the text is symbolic, but if it is pointed out that it is, what it symbolizes is evident—here the learned should not disturb the faith of simple people by declaring that these texts are symbolic. Ibn-Rushd accuses the Mu`tazilites and the Ash`arites, al-Ghazālī in particular, for having made and publicized bold interpretations that have created divisions among Muslims. (34)
6.4.10 Moshe ben Maimon
Moshe ben Maimon considered his own teachings likely to be misunderstood and found shocking by the masses. He therefore urged his auditors not to divulge his teachings. (35) A fundamental principal is that anthropomorphic Scripture texts should not be taken literally. He devotes the whole first part of Dalāla al-ḥā'irīn to illustrate this principle. Elsewhere he devotes much space to Scriptural exegesis, attempting to show that what he proposes as philosophical truth agrees with Scripture.
He admits that Scripture passages can be given different interpretations (ta'wīl), for instance to support creation from eternity. But, he says, there is no reason to do so, since there is no proof that the world always existed. Besides, creation in time accords with God's free choice of a certain people in a certain time, the raising up of certain prophets and working certain miracles through them, all through his free choice. Furthermore, temporal creation accords with the traditional teaching of the rabbis.
6.5 Thomas Aquinas
Against the Ḥanbalites and the Ash`arites who so exalt revelation that they give little or no value to reason, and against Muḥammad ar-Rāzī who recognizes only human reason, Thomas agrees with the other Arab theologians and philosophers who recognize the autonomy of reason and of revelation. Each of them leads to areas of truth where the other cannot go, but they overlap when it comes to certain fundamental truths concerning God, man and creation in general. (36)
Can there be a conflict between the two? God has endowed us with reason by which we know certain truths so clearly that it is impossible to deny them. It is likewise illegitimate to deny the truths of faith, which are confirmed by divine authority. Thus anything that is contrary to the truths of reason or of revelation cannot come from God, but must come from wrong reasoning. The conclusions of such reasoning have no validity, but only the appearance of truth. (37)
1. For the history of these schools, cf. R. Caspar, Traité de théologie musulmane, I. Histoire le la pensée religieuse musulmane; L. Gardet & M.-M. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane, pp. 21-93; on faith and reason pp. 303-373.
2. Cf. Henri Laoust, Le Traité de droit public d'Ibn Taimiyya (Beirut: Institut franais de Damas, 1948) et Les schismes dans l'Islam, introduction à une étude de la religion musulmane (Paris: Payot, 1965).
3. Cf. Jacques Jomier, Le commentaire coranique du Manār and Introduction à l'Islam actuel.
4. Cf. Abū-l-`Alā Maudūdī, Fundamental principles of Islamic political theory, Islamic law and constitution,Political theory of Islam, and Towards understanding Islam.
6. Cf. Olivier Carré, Mystique et politique, lecture révolutionnaire du Coran par Sayyid Qutb, Frère Musulman radical.
6. Cf. J. Kenny, "Aux sources des mouvements radicaux dans l'Islam".
7. >Cf. G.-C. Anawati et Louis Gardet, Mystique musulmane; Robert Caspar, Cours de mystique musulmane.
8. Risāla fī kamiyya kutub Arisūālīs, pp. 372-376.
9. Kitāb al-falsafa al-ūlā, pp. 34-36.
10. Al-`ilm al-ilāhī, 5; cf. Aḥmad ibn-`Abdallāh al-Kirmānī, al-Aqwāl adh-dhahabiyya; Abū-Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, al-Munāẓarāt.
11. Cf. Ismā`īl al-Majdū`, in the preface to al-Munāzarāt.
12. Abū-Hātim ar-Rāzī, Munāzarāt.
13. Ibid.
14. Pp. 61-69, 72.
16. Pp. 69-70.
16. Pp. 132 ff.
17. Al-Fawz al-aṣghar, p. 128.
18. P. 191.
19. Pp. 43-63.
20. P. 49.
21. Pp. 47, 51-53.
22. P. 63.
23. P. 94.
24. P. 226.
26. Pp. 227-228.
26. Pp. 229-233.
27. Tahāfut, II, pp. 550-553, 558, 624-625, 646-649, 736.
28. II, p. 651.
29. II, pp. 791-792, 866-869.
30. II, p. 868.
31. II, p. 798.
32. Qur'ān 59:1 etc.
33. Cf. chapter 4.4.
34. Pp. 155-158.
36. Dalāla al-ḥā'irīn, pp. 23-24, 76-85, 183, 377, 463.
36. Contra gentiles, I, nos. 4-6.
37. Ibid., I, nos. 7-8.