On the First Principles of Government
by David Hume

    Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human
affairs with a philosophical eve, than the easiness with which
the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission,
with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those
of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is
effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of
the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but
opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is
founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most
military governments, as well as to the most free and most
popular. The soldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive
his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their
sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his
mamalukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinion.
    Opinion is of two kinds, to wit, opinion of INTEREST, and
opinion of RIGHT. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand
the sense of the general advantage which is reaped from
government; together with the persuasion, that the particular
government, which is established, is equally advantageous with
any other that could easily be settled. When this opinion
prevails among the generality of a state, or among those who have
the force in their hands, it gives great security to any
government.
    Right is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROPERTY.
What prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may
easily be understood, by observing the attachment which all
nations have to their ancient government, and even to those
names, which have had the sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always
begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous
sentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to
be prodigal both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of
public justice. There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at
first sight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the
frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a
faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all
the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party;
and yet, when a faction is formed upon a point of right or
principle, there is no occasion, where men discover a greater
obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and equity. The
same social disposition of mankind is the cause of these
contradictory appearances.
    It is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to
property is of moment in all matters of government. A noted
author has made property the foundation of all government; and
most of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that
particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but still it
must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great
influence in this subject.
    Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of
right to power, and of right to property, are all governments
founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are
indeed other principles, which add force to these, and determine,
limit, or alter their operation; such as self-interest, fear, and
affection: But still we may assert, that these other principles
can have no influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence
of those opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be
esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of
government.
    For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the
expectation of particular rewards, distinct from the general
protection which we receive from government, it is evident that
the magistrate's authority must be antecedently established, at
least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The
prospect of reward may augment his authority with regard to some
particular persons; but can never give birth to it, with regard
to the public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from
their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any
considerable number of the state would never center in any
particular set of men, if these men had no other title to
magistracy, and had no separate influence over the opinions of
mankind. The same observation may be extended to the other two
principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to
fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but
from fear; since, as a single man, his bodily force can reach but
a small way, and all the farther power he possesses must be
founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of
others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a sovereign
extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must
antecedently be supposed invested with a public character,
otherwise the public esteem will serve him in no stead, nor will
his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.
    A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance
of power, and the balance of property do not coincide. This
chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the state has
acquired a large share in the property; but from the original
constitution of the government, has no share in the power. Under
what pretence would any individual of that order assume authority
in public affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their
ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public
would ever favour such usurpations. But where the original
constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order
of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for
them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance
of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the
case with the house of commons in ENGLAND.
    Most writers, that have treated of the BRITISH government,
have supposed, that, as the lower house represents all the
commons of GREAT BRITAIN, its weight in the scale is proportioned
to the property and power of all whom it represents. But this
principle must not be received as absolutely true. For though the
people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons,
than to any other member of the constitution; that house being
chosen by them as their representatives, and as the public
guardians of their liberty; yet are there instances where the
house, even when in opposition to the crown, has not been
followed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the
tory house of commons in the reign of king WILLIAM. Were the
members obliged to receive instructions from their constituents,
like the DUTCH deputies, this would entirely alter the case; and
if such immense power and riches, as those of all the commons of
GREAT BRITAIN, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to
conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of
people, or withstand that overbalance of property. It is true,
the crown has great influence over the collective body in the
elections of members; but were this influence, which at present
is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing
over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted; and no
skill, popularity, or revenue, could support it. I must,
therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration in this particular
would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would
soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of
no inconvenient form. For though the people, collected in a body
like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when
dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of
reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in
a great measure, broken; and the public interest may be pursued
with some method and constancy. But it is needless to reason any
farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to
have place in GREAT BRITAIN, and which seems not to be the aim of
any party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient
government as much as possible, without encouraging a passion for
such dangerous novelties.